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What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have?
Elena Pribytkova

Abstract
This Article explores global human rights obligations, which form the least elucidated and
the most unfulfilled type of extraterritorial obligations. Global obligations represent a key legal
tool for empowering the most vulnerable individuals and social groups, promoting social justice,
and reducing extreme poverty and inequality worldwide. Despite their importance, global
obligations have not yet received adequate legal recognition, regulation, and realization. The
Article outlines the main contours of the conception of global obligations. While defending a
human rights-based cosmopolitan concept of justice, it addresses issues surrounding the nature,
status, content, scope, and hierarchy of moral duties towards non-compatriots and shows under
which conditions and to what extent these duties should be recognized as human rights obligations
of multiple actors. The Article aims to demonstrate that global obligations are morally justified
human rights obligations that bind all members of the international community and require their
legal regulation and implementation. It suggests a new classification of global obligations and
stresses their significance for the enjoyment of guarantees of relational and distributive justice, as
well as for promoting a shift from a state-centered to human-centered global order. It also seeks
to uncover the interrelation between philosophical discourse, normative legal order, and legal
practice. The Article explains how contemporary theories of global justice can contribute to the
justification, conceptualization, allocation, and implementation of global obligations. It translates
philosophical ideas into the language of law and incorporates empirical findings in relation to
global obligations. At the same time, it examines whether human rights theory and practice
regarding global obligations are capable of, and essential to, solving widely debated issues of global
justice.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
I am in no way beneath thee in moral worth and . . . , as a person, I am equal to thee.1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.2

In the modern globalized world, actions of multiple global actors—states,
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)3 and non-state actors (NSAs)4—have a
crucial impact on the enjoyment of human rights by individuals worldwide,
especially by those in poverty. Examples of such actions include wars and military
interventions, unfair trade and investment policies, inadequate international
financial regulations and illicit financial flows, harmful exploitation of natural
resources, environmental destruction, economic sanctions, and injurious
development aid programs. Extraterritorial obligations5 are a key legal tool for
holding global actors accountable for their human rights violations, promoting
social justice, and reducing extreme poverty and inequality worldwide. Despite
their importance, extraterritorial obligations have not yet received adequate legal
recognition, regulation, and realization. Scholars and practitioners have noted
major discrepancies between globalization and contemporary human rights law:6
obligations corresponding to economic, social, and cultural rights (socioeconomic rights) are still often considered to be applicable only within states’
borders (if at all);7 obligations of IGOs and NSAs are frequently believed to be

1

FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, A WRITER’S DIARY 512 (2009).

2

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].

3

For example, U.N. agencies, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
For example, non-governmental organizations and foundations, transnational corporations,
religious groups, paramilitary and armed resistance groups.
Extraterritorial obligations are neither horizontal obligations of actors that are non-subordinate to
one another (such as states and NSAs), nor vertical obligations between actors at different levels of
hierarchy (such as state governments and their citizens). Rather, they are diagonal obligations of
global actors towards individuals. On the usage of and interrelation between various terms for
describing extraterritorial obligations, see Mark Gibney, On Terminology: Extraterritorial Obligations, in
GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (Malcom Langford et al. eds., 2013).

4

5

6

See, for example, Wouter Vandenhole, Emerging Normative Frameworks on Transnational Human Rights
Obligations 1 (EUI Working Paper, Law 2012/17), http://perma.cc/RU5B-V8Z4; Nehal Bhuta, The
Frontiers of Extraterritoriality—Human Rights Law as Global Law, in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS CHALLENGES 1 (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016); ARNE
VANDENBOGAERDE, TOWARDS SHARED ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: LAW, PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES 1–5 (2016).

7

ETO Consortium, The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 3 (2013).
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exhausted by negative duties to respect human rights;8 and existing remedies for
the violation of extraterritorial obligations in the area of socio-economic rights are
very limited and difficult to access for individual claimants.9 A wide area of
extraterritorial relations remains, therefore, an accountability-free zone.
Global actors, as members of the international community, are responsible
not only for the human rights violations they cause but also for the realization of
socio-economic rights universally. The latter type of extraterritorial obligations is
called “obligations of a global character” or “global obligations.”10 As the least
elucidated and the most unfulfilled type of extraterritorial obligations, global
obligations form the subject of this study.
In comparison to extraterritorial obligations concerning civil and political
rights, extraterritorial obligations relating to socio-economic rights are
substantially less examined. Furthermore, neither researchers nor practitioners
have comprehensively explored the nature, status, content, scope, right-holders,
and duty-bearers of global obligations, which correspond to socio-economic
rights, and the mechanisms necessary for their implementation.
The history of the study of global obligations can be divided into three major
periods. The first is a preparatory period characterized by fragmentary research
on diverse aspects of global obligations, including global obligations presupposed
by international human rights instruments,11 those corresponding to certain socioeconomic rights,12 and global commitments derived from the right to
8

9

10

See SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 151–52 (2001); John Ruggie, Interim Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).
See, for example, Ashfaq Khalfan, Division of Responsibility Amongst States, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE
DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 299, 301 (Malcom Langford et al. eds., 2013); VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note
6, at 89–140.
See ETO Consortium, supra note 7, at 6 (principle 8 of the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter the
Maastricht Principles]).

11

See, for example, SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES’ HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2006); Magdalena Sepúlveda, Obligations of
‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271 (2006); Wouter Vandenhole, Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal Obligation to Cooperate Internationally for Development?, 17
INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 23 (2009); Michael Wabwile, Implementing the Social and Economic Rights of Children
in Developing Countries: The Place of International Assistance and Cooperation, 18 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 355
(2010); Fons Coomans, The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 11
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2011).

12

See, for example, Sigrun I. Skogly, Right to Adequate Food: National Implementation and Extraterritorial
Obligations, 11 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 339 (2007); Judith Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Human
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development and the Millennium Development Goals.13
The second period is associated with the adoption of a milestone soft law
document, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011) (hereinafter the
Maastricht Principles),14 and commentaries to it15 that provided an important
systematic exposition of the general principles, definition, and types of states’
extraterritorial obligations. The Maastricht Principles have great merit because,
unlike soft law principles governing extraterritorial obligations of other actors, 16
they recognize states’ “obligations of a global character.” At the same time, the
Maastricht Principles are limited in several important respects: (1) they pay
comparatively less attention to global obligations than to remedial extraterritorial
obligations relating to states’ acts and omissions; (2) they focus exclusively on
obligations of states, though they claim to be applicable to IGOs as well,17 and,
therefore, obligations of other NSAs and individuals are beyond their scope; (3)
they bolster a state-centered view of global obligations, including global
obligations to assist in the realization of socio-economic rights; (4) they do not
specify a normative basis, nature, or status of global obligations; and (5) while
Rights Responsibility of International Assistance and Cooperation in Health, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 104 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010).
13

See, for example, Philipp Dann, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The World Bank, UNDP and
Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 Archiv des Völkerrechts 381 (2006); MARGOT E.
SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: WORLD POVERTY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) [hereinafter GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY]; CASTING
THE NET WIDER: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND NEW DUTY-BEARERS (Margot E. Salomon
et al. eds., 2007).

14

The Maastricht Principles are a non-binding international expert opinion, in the creation of which
40 prominent human rights scholars and practitioners took part in 2011. For a critique of the
Maastricht Principles as a human rights instrument, see Ralph Wilde, Dilemmas in Promoting Global
Economic Justice through Human Rights Law, in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS CHALLENGES 127 (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016).
See, for example, Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012);
Margot E. Salomon & Ian Seiderman, Human Rights Norms for a Globalized World: The Maastricht
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3 GLOB.
POL’Y 458 (2012); Fons Coomans, Situating the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Faculty of Law, Working Paper,
2013).

15

16

17

See, for example, Tilburg Guiding Principles on the World Bank, IMF and Human Rights, in WORLD BANK,
IMF AND HUMAN RIGHTS 247 (Willem van Genugten et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Tilburg Guiding
Principles]; U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft
Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations Adopted at its Sixty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/66/10 (2011) [hereinafter Draft Articles on International Organizations].
ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 16 of the Maastricht Principles).
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interpreting global obligations as obligations of conduct, rather than obligations
of result, they leave many issues surrounding their content and scope unclear.
The third period is represented by recent studies aimed at finding solutions
to questions that the Maastricht Principles leave open (especially regarding the
direct extraterritorial obligations of NSAs and IGOs), where global obligations
are still given an insignificant place.18 Most contemporary studies concentrate on
global obligations of conduct, that is, obligations to cooperate and assist,19 and in
particular obligations to cooperate for sustainable development.20 Global
obligations of result—interactional obligations to realize socio-economic rights
universally and institutional obligations to create and maintain a just global
order—often fall outside the scope of these studies.21
This Article proposes ways to fill two major gaps in the field: the lack of a
systematic legal conception, and the lack of a well-developed legal framework of
various actors’ global obligations. Its primary purposes are therefore: first, to
justify global obligations in the area of socio-economic rights as human rights
obligations of multiple actors; and second, to analyze their nature, status, types,
content, and scope. It aims to clarify several important issues on which, as of yet,
there is no agreement in the literature or in practice, including: the normative basis
of global obligations (whether they are based on human rights or other demands
for justice); their status (whether they are moral or legal obligations); their nature
18

See, for example, GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcom Langford et al. eds., 2013);
CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR A
MULTI DUTY-BEARER HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME (Wouter Vandenhole ed., 2015); WILLEM VAN
GENUGTEN, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, THE IMF AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONTEXTUALISED WAY
FORWARD (2015); THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS
CHALLENGES (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016); DUTIES ACROSS BORDERS: ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS (Bård A. Andreassen & Võ Khánh Vinh eds., 2016);
EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS FROM AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (Lilian
Chenwi & Takele Soboka Bulto eds., 2018).

19

See, for example, Margot E. Salomon, Is There a Legal Duty to Address World Poverty? (EUI Working
Papers, Law 2012/03); Takhmina Karimova, The Nature and Meaning of ‘International Assistance and
Cooperation’ under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 163
(Eibe Riedel et al. eds. 2014); VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6.
See, for example, PHILIPP DANN, THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD BANK, THE E.U. AND GERMANY (2013); MARKUS KALTENBORN, SOCIAL
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: GLOBAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE POST-2015
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2015); TAHMINA KARIMOVA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016).

20

21

For an analysis of institutional global obligations, see, for example, Arne Vandenbogaerde, The Right
to Development in International Human Rights Law: A Call for its Dissolution, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 187
(2013); Thomas Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, Assessing the Sustainable Development Goals from a Human
Rights Perspective, 32 J. INT’L & COMP. SOC. POL’Y 83 (2016).
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(whether they are obligations of conduct or obligations of result; interactional or
institutional obligations; obligations of distributive or relational justice); their
right-holders (individuals, societies, or states); and their duty-bearers (states,
special institutions, IGOs, NSAs, individuals, or the international community as a
whole). The specification of the exact content and scope of global obligations
corresponding to certain socio-economic rights, as well as rules and methods of
attributing them to particular categories of actors, goes beyond the scope of this
Article and requires further careful research.
This Article applies a methodology that aspires to uncover the interrelations
between philosophical discourse, normative legal order, and legal practice. Many
distinguished moral, political, and legal philosophers from the two camps of
statists (nationalists) and cosmopolitans, in debating the duties owed to noncompatriots (those living outside the borders of one’s state), have taken several
important steps on the path toward the justification of global obligations.22 These
debates have promoted the recognition of global obligations in world politics, as
well as their anchoring in core international hard and soft law instruments. The
potential of philosophy in solving fundamental problems relating to global
obligations, however, has been considerably underestimated and underexploited
in legal theory and practice. This Article contributes to bridging the gap between
philosophy and law by demonstrating how contemporary theories of global justice
can further the justification, conceptualization, allocation, and implementation of
global obligations. The Article translates philosophical ideas into the language of
law and incorporates empirical findings relating to global obligations. At the same
time, it explores whether human rights theory and practice regarding global
obligations are capable of, and essential to, solving widely debated issues of global
justice.
In this respect, the Article approaches the subject of global obligations from
two sides. On the one hand, it defends a human-centered cosmopolitan
conception of justice, which justifies and specifies our obligations towards noncompatriots, as a guideline for reforming the existing legal framework and
institutional design relating to global obligations. On the other hand, it shows that
these changes are also required by the fundamental norms and principles of
international human rights law. In this sense, the Article consolidates so-called
“ideal” and “conservative” aspects of justice.23 It appeals to ideal justice by
contending that philosophical justifications of what is “just” in the global domain
22

See Section II.B below.

23

“Conservative” justice focuses on existing norms, institutions, and practices, whereas “ideal” justice
calls for reforming such norms, institutions, and practices. See David Miller, Justice, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), http://perma.cc/5U2XXNZ3.
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provide strong reasons for improving existing legal instruments, institutions, and
practices in the sphere of human rights. However, it is also conservative in the
sense that it proceeds from the assumption that improving the global order
through the recognition and implementation of global obligations does not require
creating new human rights entitlements, but rather guaranteeing the universal
realization of human rights, in particular basic socio-economic rights, already
enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights.24
This Article proceeds with Section II, which undertakes a normative analysis
of duties towards non-compatriots as human rights obligations. Following it,
Section III explores the extent to which extraterritorial duties should be
acknowledged and implemented as shared human rights obligations of multiple
actors. Section IV broadly outlines a concept of global human rights obligations
and analyzes what global obligations should be realized in the domains of
relational and distributive justice. Finally, Section V offers a general conclusion.

II. O B LIGATIONS TOWARDS N ON -C OMPATRIOTS
The dominant historical and contemporary view is that states should respect,
protect, and fulfill the socio-economic rights solely of their own citizens and
residents.25 This Section demonstrates that this position is highly questionable and
underpins states’ human rights obligations towards individuals beyond their
borders.26 It starts with an examination of human-centricity and its main elements,
which are recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
which serve as justifying bases for global obligations (Section II.A). Next, this
Section explains why and to what extent the concept of global obligations
proposed in this Article is inspired by cosmopolitan intuitions, and what statist
ideas it incorporates (Section II.B). Then, it offers the foundation of the particular
conception of cosmopolitanism to be developed in this Article (Section II.C). This
Section concludes by conceptualizing global obligations as human rights
obligations (Section II.D).

24

The International Bill of Human Rights is traditionally considered to include the UDHR, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Optional Protocols to both Covenants. See
OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, http://perma.cc/937L-RU86.

25

See ETO Consortium, supra note 7, at 3; ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF
NON-STATE ACTORS 1 (2006).

26

Extraterritorial obligations of major global actors (IGOs, NSAs and individuals) are discussed in
Section III.B.
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A. Individual as the Ultimate Unit of Moral and Legal Concern
The UDHR proclaims that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.”27 This internationally-recognized norm contains several
important elements. First, each person is a bearer of inalienable dignity and human
rights, or, in other words, possesses a special moral and legal status. Second,
individuals are equal in a certain fundamental sense, as holders of dignity and
human rights, and should be treated and regarded as equals (basic equality). Third,
dignity and human rights belong to a person as a member of a human society and
not because of their special political connection with any state (membership in
humanity). All three principles are interdependent and presuppose one another.
They underlie an idea of human-centricity that sees an individual as the ultimate
unit of both moral and legal concern,28 an absolute value and supreme goal of
social, legal, political, and economic development at both local and global levels.29
The organization of the contemporary global order, marked by extreme
poverty and inequality, fails to fulfill the idea of human-centricity that is embodied
in the UDHR in three interrelated ways.
First, approximately 800 million people worldwide suffer from preventable
extreme poverty. Poverty is the cause of the death of one child every five seconds
and generally of every third person on the planet.30 This situation is incompatible
with a special moral and legal status of a person as a possessor of human dignity and
human rights. Extreme poverty is characterized by individuals’ severe material

27

28

29

30

UDHR, supra note 2, at art. 1. Being a key document signed by all member states of the U.N., the
UDHR embodies a universal political agreement on fundamental human rights (see Section II.D
below) and is considered to form an essential part of customary international law (see Section III.B
below). Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pmbl.,
Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
The term an “ultimate unit of moral concern” is used by political philosophers Thomas Pogge and
Kok-Chor Tan. See Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 48–49 (1992);
KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND
PATRIOTISM 1 (2004). I focus not just on the moral, but also on the legal status of a person. See also
Anne Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community, in JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 155 (2009).
The principle of human-centricity is compatible with the acknowledgement of value of the other
species.
See MARCUS MANUEL ET AL., FINANCING THE END OF EXTREME POVERTY 9 (2018),
http://perma.cc/W6WK-PCNK; Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 21, at 86. According to UNICEF,
in 2018, 6.2 million children under 15 years, out of which 5.3 million children under five, died
mostly from preventable or treatable poverty-related causes. See UNICEF, Levels and Trends in Child
Mortality (2019), http://perma.cc/QMS9-ANS8.
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deprivation, social exclusion, powerlessness, marginalization, and stigmatization.
In the Author’s view, one of the most essential and tragic hallmarks of poverty,
which contradicts human-centricity, is the feelings of indignity, worthlessness, and
“nobodiness” experienced by the poor. Catholic priest and lifelong advocate for
the poor, Fr. Joseph Wresinski succeeded in expressing these feelings:
For the very poor tell us over and over again that man’s greatest misfortune
is not to be hungry or unable to read, nor even to be without work. The greatest
misfortune of all is to know that you count for nothing, to the point where even your suffering
is ignored. The worst blow of all is the contempt on the part of your fellow
citizens. For it is that contempt which stands between a human being and his
rights. It makes the world disdain what you are going through and prevents
you from being recognized as worthy and capable of taking on responsibility.
The greatest misfortune of extreme poverty is that for your entire existence you are like
someone already dead.31

Second, world poverty and extreme inequality32 are inconsistent with basic
equality between individuals because they divide people into first-class and secondclass humans. In the words of contemporary legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron,
basic equality proceeds from the assumption that “fundamentally there is just one
sort of human being, just one rank of humanity.”33 In today’s world, individuals’
place of birth, residence, and their special political ties with the state strongly shape
not only their enjoyment of basic rights but all their life prospects.34 As economist
Branko Milanovic argues, we can distinguish between a “citizenship premium,”
held by those born in the “right” countries, and a “citizenship penalty” imposed
on those born in the “wrong” places.35
It is a commonly-held belief that only few contemporary political cultures
deny the equality of people as humans.36 The current global institutional structure,
however, stands in stark contradiction with such an optimistic view. Rather than
expressing respect for human dignity and human rights,37 that structure reinforces
31

32

33
34
35

36

37

Joseph Wresinski, The Very Poor, Living Proof of the Indivisibility of Human Rights, in EXTREME POVERTY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JOSEPH WRESINSKI 20 (Quentin Wodon ed., 2000) (emphasis
added).
According to Oxfam, in 2018, 26 people had the same wealth as the poorest half of humanity (3.8
billion people living under $5.50 per day). See MAX LAWSON ET AL., PUBLIC GOOD OR PRIVATE
WEALTH? 12 (2019), http://perma.cc/A8QT-9JCB. The poor’s share in global income amounts to
only about 2 percent. See Pogge & Sengupta, supra note 21, at 86.
JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 6 (2017).
See TAN, supra note 28, at 28.
BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
131 (2016).
See, for example, WALDRON, supra note 33, at 7 (noting that modern differences in “sortal status” that
“categorize[] legal subjects on the basis of the sort of person they are” are difficult to find).
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 386 (rev. ed. 1999).
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the norms and practices infringing them. The unjust international order, like many
national orders, results in branding the poor as a different kind of human being
and internalizing the feelings of such stigma in the impoverished themselves.38
The extraterritorial actions and policies of developed states, including their
development assistance programs, are often based on standards that citizens of
these states would never agree to apply domestically.
Third, in the modern state-centered world, the enjoyment of human dignity
and human rights depends on the state’s ability and desire to guarantee it for its
citizens and residents. In cases of arbitrariness, inaction, or weakness of state
authorities, individuals cannot exercise these fundamental entitlements associated
with their membership in humanity. In such cases, the enjoyment of human dignity
and human rights is possible only if appropriate arrangements are made at the
supranational level. Membership in humanity gives rise to the right to a just global
order in which human dignity and human rights are ensured. Those individuals
whose human rights are ignored or violated by their state should be able to claim
their realization through joint efforts by the members of the international
community.
This idea resonates with the conception of the “right to have rights”
advanced by political philosopher Hannah Arendt. According to one of her
interpretations of this right, it is the “right of every individual to belong to
humanity” that is to be guaranteed by humanity itself.39 As contemporary political
thinker Seyla Benhabib elaborates, humanity is “the addressee of the claim that
one ‘should be acknowledged as a member [of],’” and receive protection from,
human society.40 Building on the analysis of Arendt and Benhabib, we can
conclude that humanity as a whole is bound by an obligation to construct global
institutions through which human rights associated with membership in humanity
may be realized. Translating this philosophical proposition into the language of
law, the right to have rights can be interpreted as the entitlement to a just global
order expressed in Article 28 of the UDHR.41
In this respect, global obligations represent a significant tool for the
realization of individuals’ essential entitlements to their special moral and legal
38

39
40

41

See, for example, ROBERT WALKER, THE SHAME OF POVERTY (2014); POVERTY AND SHAME: GLOBAL
EXPERIENCES (Elaine Chase & Grace Bantebya-Kyomuhendo eds., 2014); THE SHAME OF IT:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ANTI-POVERTY POLICY (Erika K. Gubrium et al. eds., 2013).
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 298 (rev. ed. 1968).
SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 58 (2004); see also
ALISON KESBY, THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS: CITIZENSHIP, HUMANITY, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2012).
The UDHR entitles all individuals “to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in [the UDHR] can be fully realized.” UDHR, supra note 2, at art. 28. See Section
IV.A below.
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status, basic equality, and membership in humanity and to the elimination of the
main obstacles to the enjoyment of these entitlements, namely poverty and
extreme inequality.

B. Why Cosmopolitanism?
For more than half a century, issues surrounding negative and positive duties
towards non-compatriots have been at the center of intensive philosophical
debates between statists arguing for inter-state justice42 and cosmopolitans
pleading for global justice.43 The modern versions of statism and cosmopolitanism
provide a wide range of interpretations of moral, political, and legal dimensions
of global obligations. Despite their discrepancies, however, these approaches are
not strictly polar.44 Advocates of both approaches recognize certain duties towards
non-compatriots. Their differences arise from their understandings of the
normative basis, nature, status, conditions, content, and scope of these duties.45
While the concept of global obligations developed in this Article is guided
predominantly by cosmopolitan ideas, some statist arguments are also taken into
consideration. The primary reasons why this Article elaborates a cosmopolitan
approach to global obligations are discussed below.
First, this Article proceeds from a cosmopolitan assumption of the possibility
of arriving at a universal concept of justice that expresses a global political consensus between
42

43

44

45

See, for example, MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983) [hereinafter SPHERES OF JUSTICE]; MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT
AT HOME AND ABROAD (1994) [hereinafter THICK AND THIN]; WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE
VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP (2001); Robert E. Goodin,
What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?, 98 ETHICS 663 (1988); Thomas Nagel, The Problem
of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005); RICHARD MILLER, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: THE
ETHICS OF POVERTY AND POWER (2010).
See, for example, Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229 (1972); PETER
UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996); HENRY SHUE,
BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1996); CHARLES R.
BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (rev. ed. 1999); SIMON CANEY,
JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY (2005); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE.: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006); THOMAS POGGE,
WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS (2d ed.
2008) [hereinafter WORLD POVERTY]; THOMAS POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND
THE PRO-POOR RHETORIC (2010) [hereinafter POLITICS]; TAN, supra note 28; Richard J. Arneson,
What Do We Owe to Distant Needy Strangers?, in PETER SINGER UNDER FIRE: THE MORAL ICONOCLAST
FACES HIS CRITICS (Jeffrey Schaler ed., 2009).
For the possibility of convergence of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, see TAN, supra note 28, at
85–106; Rainer Forst, Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 161
(2001).
Forst, Tan and Caney provide an excellent overview of the main arguments of statism and
cosmopolitanism. See Forst, supra note 44, at 160–65; TAN, supra note 28, at 85; CANEY, supra note
43, at 1–15.
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people sharing various views on justice.46 In a multicultural world, the concept of global
justice should be the result of an overlapping consensus, which is reached
politically, that is, independently from any comprehensive (ideological,
philosophical, religious, and cultural) doctrines.47 This approach within an
overlapping consensus, or an ethical minimum, theory is called justificatory
minimalism. In contrast to substantive minimalism, it seeks not an intersection of
various values, but a practical convergence as a basis for universal rules.48
Internationally-recognized human rights best confirm the correctness of
cosmopolitan intuitions regarding not only the possibility, but also the existence,
of a universal normative basis for global justice.49 This Article develops the idea
of human rights as a product of an overlapping consensus and a foundation for a
political conception of global justice; and on this basis, elaborates a human rightsbased version of cosmopolitanism. Human rights represent “globally uniform
minimum standards for the treatment [of individuals]”50 by states, other global
actors, and the international community as a whole. It is important to add that the
results of this political consensus are not only human rights themselves, but also
essential underlying principles of human rights law (such as the principle of
human-centricity embodied in Article 1 of the UDHR).
46

Cf. statists’ arguments that a national affinity—a common understanding of what is just shared by
members of a community—is an important precondition for relations of justice. From their
perspective, an autonomous, full-blooded concept of global justice is impossible, since it always has
a local root system that feeds it. See THICK AND THIN, supra note 42, at 4.

47

The concept of an “overlapping consensus” was developed by a political philosopher John Rawls.
See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7–8 (1987); John
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247 (1985); John Rawls, The
Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, in DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY 160 (Derek Matravers & Jon Pike eds., 2003).
On justificatory and substantive minimalism, see Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The
Most We Can Hope For?, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 192 (2004); DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 172 (2007) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY]; Charles R. Beitz,
Human Rights as a Common Concern, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 269 (2001); Charles Taylor, Conditions of an
Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 124
(Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5–6 (2000).

48

49

50

For instance, a philosopher and a member of the French National Commission of UNESCO
involved in the discussion of the UDHR’s draft, Jacques Maritain, maintained that the Declaration
was a product of a political agreement between “proponents of violently opposed ideologies”: “Yes,
they replied, we agreed on these rights, providing we are not asked why. With the ‘why’, the dispute
begins.” Jacques Maritain, Introduction, in UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 9 (1950); JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 76–77 (1951). For an
analysis of Maritain’s human rights conception, see Elena Pribytkova, Natural Law and Natural Rights
According to Vladimir Solovyov and Jacques Maritain, in ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
69 (Alfons Brüning & Evert van der Zweerde eds., 2012).
POLITICS, supra note 43, at 10.
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Second, as opposed to statist approaches, which favor the development of
international justice treating states as the key agents in the global arena, the
cosmopolitan conception deployed in this Article concentrates on global justice,
maintaining that persons are major subjects and right-holders.51 This Article argues
that principles of global justice should penetrate states’ borders and directly
regulate relations of individuals with multiple global actors.52
The conflict between statist and cosmopolitan attitudes is reflected in the
dualism of contemporary international law. While public international law
regulating inter-state relations proceeds from statist assumptions, international
human rights law focusing on entitlements of individuals is based on
cosmopolitan ideas. Drawing inspiration from cosmopolitanism, this Article
contends that taking human rights seriously necessarily entails a shift from a statecentered to a human-centered approach, and from international justice to global
justice. At the same time, this Article gives consideration to statist arguments that
the state should remain an important actor in the international community and a
defender of the human rights and fundamental interests of its people.
Third, proponents of statism assert that relations of justice presuppose a wellestablished and institutionalized social cooperation that the contemporary
international order lacks.53 I agree with cosmopolitan theorists, who, relying in
part on convincing empirical evidence of intensive present-day global cooperation
among various actors, conclude that we already have a certain global institutional
scheme.54 This scheme is considerably less developed than national or regional
schemes, is extremely unfair, and infringes human dignity and human rights.
However, this imbalance between national and global institutional structures
further supports the cosmopolitan prescription that a global structure should be
improved.55 As this Article elaborates, individuals’ entitlement to membership in
humanity gives rise to the right to a just global order, which binds all members of
the international community to a shared obligation to create and maintain fair
global institutions. Principles of justice are therefore to be applied universally and

51

Thomas Pogge identifies three main features of cosmopolitanism: all persons are equally considered
(universality) to be the ultimate units of moral concern (individualism) for everyone in the world
(generality). See Pogge, supra note 28, at 48–49.

52

Statist approaches propose that the operation of the principles of international justice governing
relations between states apply only across the borders of sovereign states, while the relationship
between individuals falls exclusively within the ambit of national social justice. See RAWLS, supra note
37, at 6–7; JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLE 119–20 (1999).

53

See Nagel, supra note 42, at 113–14, 121–22.
See, for example, Forst, supra note 44, at 163; BEITZ, supra note 43, at 143–44; POLITICS, supra note 43,
at 10–25; TAN, supra note 28, at 27–28.
See Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 687 (1988).

54

55
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to correct global injustice to the same degree that they (should) apply and correct
local injustice.56
Fourth, this Article advocates for the cosmopolitan view that global principles
of justice can serve as instruments for improving institutions and practices both domestically and
worldwide.57 Acting separately and jointly through their participation in IGOs, as
well as by regulating and influencing the conduct of NSAs and individuals, states
represent their people. Individuals have justified interests in their states not
infringing upon the human dignity and human rights of people abroad, and share
obligations to prevent these infringements.58 Thus, states’ implementation of
global obligations pertaining to human rights is on behalf of and in the justified
interests of the people they represent. Since a just national order does not
guarantee a non-violation of human rights extraterritorially,59 territorial human
rights obligations should be supplemented by extraterritorial ones, while national
norms, institutions, and practices should be brought into accord with principles
of global justice.60
Fifth, like other supporters of cosmopolitanism, I consider the guarantees
of a decent social minimum to be at the core of social and global justice and to require the
realization of basic socio-economic rights universally.61 This Article argues that the capacity
to be a holder of fundamental socio-economic rights is not connected with
membership in any society except the human one.62 Relatedly, based on
56

57

58

59
60

61

62

BEITZ, supra note 43, at 143–53; Thomas Pogge, Rawls and Global Justice, 18 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY 227, 243 (1988); TAN, supra note 28, at 28; Forst, supra note 44, at 165.
Statists view demands of global justice rather as a threat to domestic relations of social justice, and
positive duties towards non-compatriots are seen as contradicting the fundamental interests of
compatriots, especially those relating to the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. See Nagel, supra
note 42, at 131–32.
Political philosopher Henry Shue is persuasive in his insistence that a government that violates
human rights of people abroad is “failing in its duties both to the victims of the deprivation and, as
an agent with service duties, to its own population.” SHUE, supra note 43, at 152.
See Forst, supra note 44, at 173.
SHUE, supra note 43, at 131. The improvement of local norms, institutions, and practices required
by global justice includes, for example, institutionalizing human rights impact assessments (HRIAs)
and human rights due diligence (HRDD) and implementing them with regard to all projects and
policies which might affect the enjoyment of human rights abroad; creating accountability
mechanisms to guarantee the right to remedies to those suffering from extraterritorial human rights
violations; and accumulating means for global assistance.
I disagree with proponents of statism, who believe that special relations within a particular society
are a key condition for exercising socio-economic rights. See, for example, Nagel, supra note 42, at
127, 131–32.
Advocates of cosmopolitanism argue that it is necessary to distinguish between fundamental ties
that bind all of mankind and complementary bonds between members of certain communities. See
Johann Frick, National Partiality, Immigration, and the Problem of Double-Jeopardy 4–5,
http://perma.cc/K829-9N6F. Being a product of global political consensus, basic socio-economic

398

Vol. 20 No. 2

What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have?

Pribytkova

cosmopolitan intuitions, international human rights law also recognizes that,
unlike political rights (the implementation of which should be ensured by the state
within its jurisdiction), the enjoyment of basic socio-economic rights is not
conditioned on political bonds between an individual and the state.63 In many
contexts, territorial and extraterritorial obligations corresponding to basic socioeconomic rights are simultaneous and equal in their content and scope.64 In some
situations, however, as proponents of statism rightly assert, global obligations are
limited in scope, and are conditional and secondary in comparison to territorial
ones.65
Thus, cosmopolitan ideas—that (1) human rights, as a result of a universal
overlapping consensus, (2) underlie a political concept of global justice and (3)
require shifting from a state-centered to human-centered global order, and (4)
supplementing and harmonizing principles and institutions of domestic justice
with those of global justice and territorial obligations with extraterritorial ones—
ground the idea that states are bound by global human rights obligations. At the
same time, some statist arguments—on (1) the significant role of the state in the
realization of human rights and corresponding obligations; (2) the necessity of
institutionalized social cooperation for relations of justice; and (3) the limits of
some global obligations in comparison to territorial ones—remain relevant for
conceptualizing states’ global obligations.

C. What Cosmopolitanism?
As the previous Section demonstrated, the justification of global obligations
relies predominantly on a cosmopolitan interpretation of justice. This Section will
briefly outline special features of the cosmopolitan conception, which this Article
elaborates and upon which a convincing understanding of global obligations can
be based.
First, this Article develops a cosmopolitan approach to global justice, which is
concerned with the role of compatriot ties for determining the content and scope

63

64

65

rights represent, in Shue’s apt words, “everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of
humanity. They are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting
person can reasonably be expected to accept.” SHUE, supra note 43, at 19.
While the ICCPR contains jurisdiction clauses, the ICESCR does not have these limitations. See
ICCPR, supra note 27, at art. 2(1); ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 2(1).
Some cosmopolitans believe that obligations towards fellow countrymen and foreigners are
identical. See, for example, Singer, supra note 43; UNGER, supra note 43. Pogge demonstrates that under
certain conditions, remedial extraterritorial obligations may prevail over national obligations. See
WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 124–51.
See Section IV.A below.
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of global obligations aimed at promoting social justice universally.66
Second, it proposes a human rights-based cosmopolitan conception67 of global justice
and justifies global obligations as human rights obligations of multiple actors. By
their nature, human rights are cosmopolitan demands that proceed from the
assumption that a person is the ultimate unit of moral and legal concern and a
major subject of justice.
Third, this Article argues that global obligations are moral obligations that
should receive legal recognition and implementation at international, regional, and
national levels. Thus, it explicates a type of legal cosmopolitanism.68
Fourth, it underscores the close interrelation between interactional cosmopolitanism69
(which formulates ethical principles directly regulating the conduct of global
actors) and institutional cosmopolitanism (which postulates principles of justice that
apply to a global institutional structure).70 This Article defends the thesis that
66

For classification of cosmopolitanism as a “doctrine about justice” and a “doctrine about culture,”
see, for example, SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 111 (2001); TAN, supra note 28, at 11. An analysis of cultural
cosmopolitanism, which focuses on the relevance of cultural ties for individuals’ identity, falls
beyond the scope of this Article.

67

Various human rights-based cosmopolitan approaches are developed in SHUE, supra note 43;
WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43; CANEY, supra note 43. For other normative grounds—in
capabilities-based (Amartya Sen & Martha Nussbaum), needs-based (David Miller), utilitarian (Peter
Singer), contractarian (Charles Beitz & Darrel Moellendorf) approaches—see Singer, supra note 43;
Amartya Sen, Justice Across Borders, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON
THE MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 37 (Pablo de Greiff & Ciaran
Cronin eds., 2002); NUSSBAUM, supra note 48; RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 48; Beitz, supra note 48;
DARREL MOELLENDORF, COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE (2002). For an analysis of various cosmopolitan
approaches, see Gillian Brock, Contemporary Cosmopolitanism: Some Current Issues, 8 PHIL. COMPASS
689, 690–91 (2013); CANEY, supra note 43, at 3–7; TAN, supra note 28, at 93–98.

68

See Section II.D below. My interpretation of legal cosmopolitanism differs from the canonical one
suggested by Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge who differentiate between moral cosmopolitanism
(that concerns moral relations between individuals) and institutional, or legal, cosmopolitanism (that
calls for a universal citizenship in a world state). See BEITZ, supra note 43, at 287; Pogge, supra note
28, at 49; TAN, supra note 28, at 10. Beitz’ and Pogge’s use of the terms “institutional” or “legal”
cosmopolitanism suggests that legal regulation and institutionalization of global obligations must
invariably be connected with a world state. This understanding follows from a state-centered vision
of human rights and is incompatible with human-centered and polycentric approaches developed
in this Article. As this Section will show, legal cosmopolitanism does not presuppose the creation
of a world state. See Cristina Lafont, Accountability and Global Governance: Challenging the State-Centric
Conception of Human Rights, 3 ETHICS & GLOBAL POLITICS 193, 198–99 (2010).
For various interactional conceptions of human rights, see SHUE, supra note 43; CANEY, supra note
43; John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN
RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 75 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (2008).
Different versions of institutional approach are represented in WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43;
POLITICS, supra note 43; BEITZ, supra note 43; TAN, supra note 28; Mathias Risse, How Does the Global
Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 349 (2005); MOELLENDORF, supra note 67.
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global obligations include both interactional duties of ethics and institutional
duties of justice.71 The realization of socio-economic rights universally requires a
just global institutional scheme. The creation and maintenance of this institutional
scheme, in turn, is hardly possible without the implementation of human rights
obligations by global actors in specific extraterritorial relations. On this premise,
the position defended in this Article differs from traditional approaches in two
important aspects: (1) whereas obligations to create a just institutional scheme are
often interpreted as duties of distributive justice,72 I consider a fair global
institutional structure to be aimed, in the first place, at guaranteeing basic equality
that has both relational and distributive implications;73 (2) though institutional and
interactional obligations are frequently treated as moral cosmopolitan duties,74 I
elaborate on their legal conception.
Fifth, this Article develops a weak, or sufficientist, cosmopolitan conception of
relational and distributive justice.75 It demonstrates that global obligations are aimed
not at eliminating inequality between persons worldwide, but at ensuring certain
minimum relational and distributive guarantees that are sufficient for the
enjoyment of basic equality. In this respect, individuals should be empowered to
participate fully in all core global institutions and practices, including essential
decision-making processes, and have secure access to a global social minimum.
Sixth, this Article proceeds from the assumption that a world state76 is neither

71

72
73
74
75
76

The difference between duties of global ethics and duties of global justice is easier to understand
through the following criteria: (1) when global ethics regulates interpersonal (interactional) relations
between various individual and collective actors, global justice focuses on global institutional
structure; (2) while ethical claims are direct claims against other actors, demands of justice are
addressed first against social and political institutions and, indirectly, against agents contributing to
these institutions’ functioning; (3) while duties of ethics are usually “limited-term commitments
with a definable goal” (for instance, disaster relief or international assistance in times of emergency),
duties of justice are systematic and ongoing commitments (for example, combating poverty and
extreme inequality). TAN, supra note 28, at 21–23. It is important to note that not only moral but
also legal human rights obligations belong to domains of ethics and justice.
BEITZ, supra note 43, at 125; WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 43–45; TAN, supra note 28, at 19.
See Sections IV.B–IV.D below.
Pogge, supra note 28, at 49.
See Sections IV.B–IV.D below. The principle of sufficiency is explicated in Section IV.D.
The possibility of global institutional order, for which cosmopolitans call, to transform into a world
state causes concern among supporters of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism. See Nagel, supra
note 42, at 115; Forst, supra note 44, at 162. According to Arendt, the creation of a world state
would mean the end of world politics. See HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 82 (1968). For
cosmopolitan arguments against a world state, see Pogge, supra note 28, at 63; TAN, supra note 28,
at 93–96; Lafont, supra note 68, at 194; CRISTINA LAFONT, Challenging the State-Centric Conception of
Human Rights without Endorsing the Ideal of a World State, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 45 (2012); Rafael Domingo, The New Global Human Community, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 563, 567,
583 (2012).
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necessary nor possible in the global political domain. On the one hand, this Article
considers that the enjoyment of rights associated with individuals’ membership in
a particular state is essential and should be guaranteed to them. On the other hand,
it calls for a polycentric global institutional structure established through cooperation among
autonomous members of the international community, including sovereign states.77 This
requires increasing the role of IGOs, NSAs (including international NGOs and
transnational corporations (TNCs)), and individuals in the universal realization of
basic socio-economic rights, while also increasing the human rights accountability
of these actors. In this context, traditional state-centered governance and
accountability modes should be harmonized with alternative, informal, and nonbureaucratic institutional solutions.78 In combination with the acknowledgement
of individuals as major subjects of justice, this will lead to the state losing its
monopoly in the international arena and promote a shift from a state-centered to
a human-centered global institutional order.
In sum, this Article develops a cosmopolitan conception of justice that
advocates for both interactional and institutional global human rights obligations
and justifies the necessity for their legal recognition, regulation, and
implementation within the polycentric global community of multiple autonomous
actors.

D. Towards a Human Rights -Based Cosmopolitanism
This Section explains why the recognition of global obligations as human
rights obligations is essential. Human rights are often defined as legitimate
entitlements that individuals have against relevant others. 79 Human rights have
several important features. They are (1) universal, (2) high-priority entitlements,
that (3) call for legal recognition, (4) give rise to corresponding obligations of
certain actors, and (5) are grounds for taking international actions against those
actors. In addition, human rights have both interactional and institutional aspects:
they are claims on “the behavior of individual and collective agents, and on the
design of social arrangements.”80 These characteristics of human rights are key to
understanding the nature of human rights-based global obligations.
77

For a large diapason of possible organizational forms of the global order, see Michael Walzer,
Governing the Globe: What Is the Best We Can Do?, DISSENT MAGAZINE (2000),
http://perma.cc/RM4G-J865.

78

See Elena Pribytkova, Global Human Rights Obligations Relating to a Decent Standard of Living
202–17 (2019) (J.S.D. dissertation, Columbia University).

79

See, for example, SHUE, supra note 43, at 13; JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13–15 (2d
ed. 2007); JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS 20–21 (2012).
UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 25 (2000). See also Section II.C above.
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First, there are lively debates about how we should understand the universality
of human rights. Article 1 of the UDHR reflects a political consensus not only on
the principle that all people are bearers of human rights, but also that they possess
these rights because they belong to the human race. This idea underlies the
principle of universality of human rights. Nevertheless, the principle itself and its
traditional understanding are often criticized.81 For instance, contemporary legal
philosopher Joseph Raz opposes the interpretation of universality, according to
which human rights belong to people by virtue of their humanity alone. He claims
that human rights are not diachronically, but rather synchronically, universal. In
other words, they are the rights that “all people living today have.”82 Rightly noting
that people have not possessed human rights at all times, Raz considers the
existence of human rights to be dependent on social, economic, and cultural
factors.83 One can hardly agree with this account. If the presence of favorable
socio-economic conditions is essential for the existence of human rights, it would
be incorrect to speak about the synchronic universality of human rights. Many
poor states do not enjoy the “common conditions of life” necessary for the (full)
realization of human rights. Nevertheless, these states have recognized human
rights, because (for various reasons) they believe that these minimum normative
standards should serve as universal regulative guidelines, and thereby have
expressed their intention to undertake all efforts for their realization
independently and in cooperation with (members of) the international
community. In this respect, human rights and corresponding (global) obligations
exist where a universal political consensus about them is achieved and they govern
the behavior of multiple actors. We deal with moral or legal human rights
depending on whether this overlapping consensus is reached only in global
political discourse or expressed in various legal sources (such as international
human rights instruments, customary international law, and jus cogens) as well.
Second, being a result of a universal political agreement regarding the most
important entitlements of a person, human rights represent high-priority claims of
individuals that surpass many other interests and entitlements. According to legal
philosopher Ronald Dworkin’s famous definition, human rights are “political
trumps held by individuals.”84 It is also important to point out the tradition of
81

82

83
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See, for example, Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights: A Critique, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
POLITICS 103 (Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 1999).
Joseph Raz, Human Rights in the Emerging World Order, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 31, 43 (2010)
(emphasis added).
Therefore, people from other epochs (for instance, the Stone Age or Ancient Rome) that lived in
other socio-economic conditions did not possess human rights. Id.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977). For critique, see Joseph Raz, Professor
Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123 (1978); András Sajó, Socioeconomic Rights and the
International Economic Order, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 223–24 (2002).
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distinguishing basic rights—human rights that, as observed by Shue, “need to be
established securely before other rights can be secured.”85 Basic human rights give
rise to priority obligations of multiple actors and constitute a decent social
minimum, which should be ensured universally.
Third, human rights and corresponding obligations are ‘citizens’ of two
worlds: moral and legal.86 This Article develops Raz’s persuasive argument that
human rights are “moral rights that call for legal-political protection.” They are
moral rights in the sense that their existence is independent of legal recognition;
but at the same time, for their enforcement, they require and have the capacity to
receive legal recognition and institutionalization.87 Since there is still no agreement
on whether global obligations should be interpreted as moral or legal obligations,88
this Article pursues the double goal of: (1) justifying global obligations as
fundamental duties of justice (moral aspect); and (2) demonstrating that global
obligations are also rooted in and correspond to human rights recognized in core
international human rights instruments (legal aspect). In this sense, global
obligations are viewed as morally justified legal obligations of various actors.
Philosophical justification and conceptualization of global obligations are
important for understanding their content and scope and should promote their
legal recognition and implementation.
Fourth, human rights precede and are the source of corresponding territorial and
extraterritorial obligations. In comparison to other duties, human rights obligations
are rooted in correlative human rights.89 It is a claim that is an essential hallmark
of human rights, that is, human rights are claimable against the relevant dutybearers. Russian-Polish scholar and forerunner of the psychological conception
85

SHUE, supra note 43, at 20.

86

Human rights scholar Jeff King differentiates between five meanings of socio-economic rights: (1)
socio-economic human rights, which belong to all human beings irrespective of their legal recognition,
and aim to guarantee a global social minimum; (2) membership in a particular society entitles
individuals to socio-economic citizenship rights, the scope of which goes beyond a global social minimum;
(3) international socio-economic rights embedded in contemporary international human rights law and
“mirroring” socio-economic human rights; (4) constitutional socio-economic rights proclaimed in states’
constitutional law and usually requiring legislative measures for their realization; and (5) enforceable
and justiciable legislative socio-economic rights guaranteed by states’ laws. The first two meanings refer
to the understanding of socio-economic rights as moral rights – entitlements justified in
contemporary political or philosophical discourse. The further three meanings characterize human
rights as legal rights – entitlements recognized by law at various levels. In this sense, any right and
corresponding obligation may be presented in all (or some) of these five categories. KING, supra
note 79, at 18–19.
Raz, supra note 82, at 31, 36, 43.

87
88
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Global obligations are frequently considered to be moral duties rather than legal obligations. See, for
example, Samantha Besson, The Bearers of Human Rights Duties and Responsibilities for Human Rights – A
Quiet (R)Evolution, 32 SOC. PHI. & POL’Y 244 (2015).
See NICKEL, supra note 79, at 11–12; SHUE, supra note 43, at 52–53, 59–60.
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of law, Leon Petrazycki called this characteristic an “attributive” nature of law.
According to Petrazycki, our rights are neither more nor less than the debts other
individuals owe to us. In this respect, right-holders are the lords of our duties to
them.90 Thus, obligations corresponding to human rights exert a stronger
influence on the behavior of duty-bearers than any other duties.91
On this premise, the task of justification and conceptualization of global
obligations as human rights obligations calls for: (1) specifying internationallyrecognized socio-economic rights that give rise to these global obligations;92 (2)
determining and assigning corresponding individual and shared obligations to
concrete actors (assigning extraterritorial obligations to various actors is possible
thanks to what Raz calls the “dynamic” character of human rights, which are
capable of generating new corresponding obligations93); and (3) undertaking
certain institutional arrangements to guarantee human rights obligations’
enforceability and justiciability.94 Thus, taking socio-economic rights seriously
requires taking corresponding global obligations seriously. Specified, allocated,
claimable, and enforceable obligations are, according to philosopher Baroness
Onora O’Neill, a sign that we are dealing with actual human rights and not with
“manifesto” or “empty” rights.95
Fifth, human rights are reasons for taking international actions against global actors.
Justifying this thesis in relation to the state, Raz defines human rights as tools
capable of setting limits on the sovereignty of states. This means that human rights
are sufficient grounds for taking international action against a state that fails to
realize its territorial human rights obligations.96 This Article contends that, since

90
91

92
93
94

95

96

LEON PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 47 (2011).
Raz likewise demonstrates that “rights are grounds of duties in others,” and they exist because they
give rise to corresponding duties. He emphasizes the priority of rights over duties and shows that
the former “are (part of) the justification” of the latter. In Raz’s opinion, human rights obligations
“secure (at least to some degree) the right-holder’s control over the object of his right.” JOSEPH
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 167–86 (1986). See also Raz, supra note 82, at 36, 39. This thesis
is close to Petrazycki’s ideas; however, from Petrazycki’s point of view, it is the claim-right
grounding a corresponding obligation, and not the obligation itself, that gives the right-holder
control over the behavior of the obliged person and the object of the right.
Cf. RAZ, supra note 91, at 183.
Id. at 186.
See TAN, supra note 28, at 51; WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 70–73; HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 187–88 (2008).
Onora O’Neill, The Dark Side of Human Rights, 81 INT’L AFF. 427, 191, 431 (2005); ONORA O’NEILL,
CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 296 (1989). Cf.
Raz, supra note 82, at 36, 39.
It appears that Raz considers that states do not enjoy immunity from international interference not
only when violating human rights, but also when failing to perform their duties to respect and
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human rights give rise to extraterritorial obligations of all global actors, they
provide grounds for: (1) sovereignty-limiting measures against states that fail to
implement their human rights obligations towards individuals beyond their
territory; and (2) taking international actions against all other global actors (IGOs,
NSAs, and individuals) that fail to perform their extraterritorial obligations.
What features of human rights obligations stem from the characteristics of
human rights analyzed above? Human rights obligations are (1) universal (that is,
their addressees are people as members of humanity) and (2) high-priority
obligations, which (3) derive from and correspond to human rights, (4) call for
their legal recognition at various levels, and (5) authorize sovereignty-limiting
measures to be taken against states and international actions against all other
members of the global community.
Why is recognizing global obligations as human rights obligations so
important? Raz convincingly demonstrates that not only the objects of a right
(such as property, work, or information), but also the very possession of the right
(which means enjoying secure access to their objects) are of value to the rightholders.97 That is why social justice and human rights advocates contend that the
lack of access to objects of basic socio-economic rights (such as adequate food,
water, sanitation, housing, clothing, health, social security, and education), which
is characteristic of poverty, reflects a serious structural human rights deficit.98 A
human rights-based approach suggests that the human rights deficit is both a
cause and a consequence of poverty, while human rights realization is an
important instrument for the alleviation of poverty and extreme inequality.99 This
approach treats the poor as holders of basic human rights to which obligations of
members of the international community correspond. It interprets severe socioeconomic deprivations as violations of human rights of the poor and breaches of
responsible actors’ correlative obligations. Poor individuals’ inability to exercise
their rights, which is not causally linked to particular agents’ acts or omissions,
gives rise to both obligations of territorial social support and global obligations to
assist.

97

promote human rights. See Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations 9–10 (Univ. of Oxford
Faculty of Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14, 2007); Raz, supra note 82, at 42.
Raz, supra note 82, at 36.

98

See, for example, ActionAid, Human Rights-Based Approaches to Poverty Eradication and Development (2008),
http://perma.cc/3SK4-PV7G.

99

See, for example, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: poverty
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Statement, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2001/10 (May 4, 2001). For critique of the view that human rights are aimed at and capable
of reducing inequality, see SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD
(2018).
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Thus, in applying a human rights-based approach and emphasizing the
precedence of human right claims to corresponding duties, this Article
demonstrates that global obligations are morally justified human rights obligations
that should receive legal recognition and realization.

E. Summary
This Section provided a normative foundation for the conception of global
obligations. It elaborated a human-centered account, which sees a person as the
ultimate unit of both moral and legal concern entitled to a special moral and legal
status, basic equality, and membership in humanity. It defended the position that,
human-centricity, which is embedded in the International Bill of Human Rights,
serves as a justifying basis for global obligations (Section II.A). This idea is at the
core of an appealing cosmopolitan vision of our obligations towards noncompatriots, though arguments made by proponents of statism should also be
taken into account in determining the content and scope of states’ global
obligations (Section II.B). While elaborating a human rights-based cosmopolitan
concept of justice, this Section suggested that global obligations are best
envisioned as morally justified human rights obligations, which should receive
legal recognition, regulation, and implementation within the polycentric global
community of multiple autonomous actors (Sections II.С–II.D).

III. E XTRATERRITORIAL O BLIGATIONS C OR RESPONDING TO
S OCIO -E CONOMIC R IGHTS
This Section analyzes the extent to which extraterritorial duties should be
acknowledged and implemented as shared human rights obligations of multiple
global actors. It examines the specific character of “diagonal” legal relations and
the significance of the recognition and realization of extraterritorial obligations
for the shift from a state-centered to a human-centered global order (Section
III.A), as well as the interrelation between remedial extraterritorial obligations and
global obligations (Section III.C). It also explores global obligations borne by
states, IGOs, NSAs, and individuals (Section III.B) and peculiarities of attributing
global obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill socio-economic rights to those
actors (Section III.D).

A. Diagonal Legal Relations: From State-Centered to HumanCentered Order
Modern legal theory distinguishes several categories of legal relations:
horizontal relations between equal actors that are not subordinate to one another
(states, IGOs, NSAs, and individuals); vertical relations between subjects that are
at different levels of one hierarchy (individuals and their governments;
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organizations’ governing bodies and their members or employees); and diagonal
relations between subjects not connected by horizontal or vertical relations
(individuals and global actors). Horizontal, vertical, and diagonal relations are
frequently interlinked; actors usually appear in several roles. Extraterritorial
relations represent diagonal legal relations; they are complex and often involve
multiple actors.
The Westphalian state-centered model of international legal order considers
nation states exercising exclusive sovereignty over their territory to be primary
actors, right-holders and duty-bearers, in the world arena, while individuals are
seen as secondary actors. In this context, primary global human rights entitlements
and obligations are attributed to states. Individuals may often only claim and
defend their human rights on the international level through the agency of their
state’s government.
Contemporary international law is, however, not homogeneous but rather
reflects a certain dualism. While international public law regulating relations
among states proceeds from statist assumptions and applies principles of
international justice, international human rights law penetrating states’ borders
and focusing on entitlements of persons is, in its main idea, cosmopolitan and
appeals to global justice. In this sense, international human rights law has
substantial potential to become global law.100
Yet, contemporary international human rights law itself is riven by internal
contradictions. It is to a large extent state-centered101 and tends to use traditional
horizontal and vertical frameworks to regulate extraterritorial legal relations,
which are diagonal by nature.
The substitution of diagonal relations with horizontal and vertical ones is
both normatively and practically inadequate. Normatively, this substitution
disempowers the actual right-holder (an individual) and transforms a duty-bearer
(the state) into a right-holder, which is a denial of human rights.
The following examples explain why the substitution is also practically
inappropriate and often leads to human rights abuses. First, the state is
traditionally deemed the primary mediator in relations between individuals and
NSAs, although expectations of the state’s success in this role are unjustifiably
high (as discussed below). Second, international assistance, including the Official
Development Aid (ODA) provided by the wealthiest donor countries as part of
100

101

See THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ITS CHALLENGES 1 (Nehal
Bhuta ed., 2016). Louis Henkin asserted that “human rights have revolutionized the international
system and international law. The law now reflects human values in addition to state values, or
allows human values to modify state values.” Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 43–44 (1996).
Lafont, supra note 68, at 198; LAFONT, supra note 76, at 54–55.
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their global obligations, is addressed not directly to poor individuals and
communities to ensure their enjoyment of basic socio-economic rights, but to
their states (horizontal relations) in order to enable states to realize territorial
obligations towards their citizens and residents (vertical relations). This practice is
widely marred by corruption, misuse of funds, and human rights violations,
exacerbating rather than solving the problems of global poverty and inequality.102
Third, there are a number of drawbacks to inter-state complaint mechanisms,
which allow a state to file a claim against another state (horizontal relations) in
defense of its residents (vertical relations):103 (1) they do not allow individuals to
formulate complaints; (2) they are not accessible if a home state government itself
participates in human rights abuses; and (3) individuals rarely benefit from interstate complaint procedures because states consider using them to be an
“unfriendly act” toward other states.104
According to legal scholar Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen’s apt expression,
legal science and practice must make a “quantum leap” to develop adequate tools
for analyzing and regulating a reality that does not fit into the usual framework of
horizontal and vertical relations.105 This “quantum leap” presupposes two

102

On “the limited effectiveness of the use of foreign funds,” see Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural
Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the
Covenant: Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Georgia, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1Add.83 (2002). On the “mismanagement of international
cooperation aid and unbalanced budgetary allocations that constitute serious breaches in the
obligations,” see Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Democratic Republic of Congo, ¶ 16, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4 (2009) [CESCR Concluding observations on Congo]. The emphasis of
global assistance should be placed on the human rights of individuals, and not on the duties of their
states. This can be achieved through the acknowledgement of individuals’ rights to seek global
assistance. The state should, therefore, act solely as people’s agent rather than a sovereign addressee
and administrator of assistance. See Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 276–82.

103

There is no international judicial body addressing individual complaints. The two world courts, the
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are able to act only on the basis
of applications made by states (or other special subjects), but not individuals. Individuals from most
states are still unable to access the existing UN treaty body-based individual complaint
mechanisms—for example, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
Committee on the Rights of the Child (U.N. CRC), Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (U.N. CRPD)—since such access depends on states’ ratifications of optional protocols
to treaties, which presuppose these complaint mechanisms.
See VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6, at 184.

104
105

Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Growing Barriers: International Refugee Law, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 80–81 (Gibney & Skogly eds., 2010). For an
analysis of vertical and horizontal interpretations of human rights, see generally John H. Knox,
Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008).
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“revolutionary” changes that will undermine the Westphalian state-centered
paradigm and prepare a move to a human-centered world order.106
First, it requires a shift from the dominating theory and practice of
international justice (which view states as major moral and legal subjects)107 to that
of global justice (which regard individuals as the ultimate units of moral and legal
concern). While implementing the fundamental principle of human-centricity
enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, international human rights
law should recognize individuals as independent and full-fledged subjects of
diagonal extraterritorial relations. Individuals should be seen as capable of
claiming directly—in other words, without the mandatory mediation of the
state—the realization of their human rights from global actors. Furthermore,
individuals should enjoy secure and direct access to effective and affordable
remedies in case of extraterritorial violations of their socio-economic rights by
these actors.
Second, it demands attributing extraterritorial obligations not only to states,
but also to other global actors so that they are directly accountable to individuals.
As previously discussed, international law proceeds from a presumption of a
“strong” state, treating states as the key global actors and the primary duty-bearers
responsible for the realization of human rights within their territories and
throughout the world.108 This pattern, however, faces two difficulties.
On the one hand, although states play a significant role in the global arena,
the role of NSAs in framing global order and influencing the enjoyment of human
rights worldwide has increased dramatically. NSAs (in particular TNCs and
international NGOs) and IGOs have come to the fore in shaping today’s global
agenda, political discourse, rules, institutions, and practices. They are both global
norm-setters and major violators of human rights, including basic socio-economic
rights.109 Many of them have capacities superior to those of the average state. For
example, in 2017, out of the world’s top 100 economies, only thirty-one were
countries while sixty-nine were TNCs.110 Ten million NGOs worldwide, which
receive donations from nearly one-third of the Earth’s population and engage a
106

107

108

109
110

On the necessity of this paradigm shift, see CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 1; Peters, supra note 28, at
155.
For critique of state-centrism, see TAN, supra note 28, at 35–39; Lafont, supra note 68, at 198–208;
LAFONT, supra note 76, at 53–57; Domingo, supra note 76, at 582.
As O’Neill rightly argues, states are considered “primary agents of justice,” while all other entities are
“secondary agents of justice, whose contribution to justice is regulated, defined and allocated by states.”
ONORA O’NEILL, JUSTICE ACROSS BOUNDARIES: WHOSE OBLIGATIONS? 160 (2016). See also Lafont,
supra note 68, at 198–99.
See NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009).
See 69 of the Richest 100 Entities on the Planet are Corporations, Not Governments, Figures Show, GLOBAL
JUSTICE NOW (Oct. 17, 2018), http://perma.cc/PV56-G7N7.
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quarter of them as volunteers, would together form the world’s fifth largest
economy.111 Decisions of IGOs, especially U.N. agencies and the Bretton Woods
Institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)),
substantially influence the political and economic systems of societies all over the
world.112 These global actors also have a greater capacity to help those in poverty
than many states.113 Relatedly, the world’s billionaires and other “ultra-high-net
worth individuals” have substantial opportunities to alleviate poverty
worldwide.114 Thus, traditional views of the state as the major actor and dutybearer do not comport with contemporary global reality. Since human rights are
legitimate entitlements of individuals against the international community, not
only states but all global actors should bear obligations proportional to the
capacities and freedoms they have.
On the other hand, states may no longer be the “natural problem-solving
unit[s]” when it comes to the effective exercise of human rights.115 In fact, as
philosopher Baroness Onora O’Neill correctly notes, they never were. Most states
are incapable of acting as primary duty-bearers and agents of justice. For example,
tyrannies and weak states cannot guarantee social justice and human rights
realization for their citizens and residents, nor can they protect their citizens and
residents from harms caused by other members of the international community.116
Home states often themselves participate in (willingly or unwillingly), initiate, and
involve global actors in human rights abuses.117 While criticizing statist approaches
to global justice, O’Neill notes that it is naïve to expect that states, as anticosmopolitan institutions, will take leading positions in implementing duties of
111
112

113

114

115
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See 25 Facts and Stats about NGOs Worldwide, http://perma.cc/U6MH-36EN.
See, for example, Tiago Stichelmans, How International Financial Institutions and Donors Influence Economic
Policies in Developing Countries (Eurodad discussion paper, 2016), http://perma.cc/E5S7-MK2D.
Major foundations and NGOs are capable of providing assistance comparable to that of the biggest
state donors. If the list of DAC donors included charitable organizations, the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, the world’s biggest charitable organization, would take twelfth place. See Private
development assistance: key facts and global estimates, DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES (2016),
http://perma.cc/K4LV-2XLE.
A mere 1% wealth tax imposed on the world’s 2,208 billionaires and 256,000 “ultra-high-net worth
individuals” would collect, $420 billion per year, approximately 2.5 times more than contemporary
ODA ($146.6 billion). See JEFFREY D. SACHS ET AL., CLOSING THE SDG BUDGET GAP 26 (2018),
http://perma.cc/D6UM-9JPY; OECD, Development Aid Stable in 2017 with More Sent to Poorest
Countries, http://perma.cc/ZC93-GVN6 [hereinafter OECD Development Aid].
See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 66 (1997).
O’NEILL, supra note 108, at 164–65.
States often ask for international assistance to finance “monstrous” projects, which abuse human
rights of the most vulnerable individuals and groups. For example, the World Bank has funded
projects for the construction of more than 500 dams in 92 countries that caused severe violations
of human rights and serious environmental damages. See Dams & the World Bank, THE WHIRLED
BANK GROUP (2003), http://perma.cc/EY7F-WUVM.
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global justice.118 One can only agree with her thesis that the embodiment of justice
and the realization of fundamental human rights should not be “endlessly
postponed until more competent and just states emerge.”119 Therefore, in a rapidly
changing world, multiple actors other than states (IGOs, NSAs, and individuals)
should be recognized as agents of global justice and duty-bearers in diagonal
extraterritorial relations.
Thus, the recognition of individuals as full-fledged subjects of extraterritorial
legal relations and the allocation of extraterritorial obligations to multiple global
actors should enable the “quantum leap” from international justice to global
justice as well as from a state-centered to a human-centered global order. This
does not, however, abolish states’ role as “agents” through which individuals may
claim and enforce their human rights.120 This also does not eliminate states’
obligations to influence the conduct of other actors as part of their territorial and
extraterritorial duties to protect human rights.

B. Multiple Duty-Bearers
As the previous Section demonstrates, global legal relations involve multiple
actors, all of which should be recognized as agents of justice and bearers of
extraterritorial obligations. This Section examines normative foundations for
extraterritorial human rights obligations of major global actors, along with the
peculiarities of their obligation regimes.
Global actors may be classified into several main groups: states, IGOs,
NSAs, and individuals.121 The obligation regimes of these actors differ, though
they also often overlap. The content and scope of their obligations depend on
several factors. First, they depend on the actors’ nature and the purposes of their
creation (for collective actors). Though all actors possess certain extraterritorial
obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights, some of them (for instance,

118
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O’NEILL, supra note 108, at 160. Some question whether international law itself is part of the
solution of regulating the behavior of NSAs versus part of the problem. For an analysis, see
CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 6.
Cf. “If we take the universalism of obligations as seriously as we have often taken the universalism
of rights, we need to look realistically at actual agents and agencies, with their actual powers and
vulnerabilities.” O’NEILL, supra note 108, at 176.

120

For the role of states as people’s agents in relation to the right to development, see GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 116.

121

Global actors may also be classified into two categories: NSAs, which include a wide range of
subjects from IGOs to individuals, and states. See, for example, CLAPHAM, supra note 25; NON-STATE
ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Math Noortmann et al. eds., 2015); Peters et al., supra note 109,
at 14. For the purpose of my study, I distinguish IGOs and individuals into separate categories.
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certain U.N. special agencies,122 foundations, and NGOs) specially aim to provide
assistance to those in need. Second, obligations are contingent on the role played
by a particular actor. For example, states’ extraterritorial obligations vary when
they act directly or through IGOs, or regulate the conduct of NSAs. Third,
obligation regimes depend on whether global actors are individual or collective
actors.
It is necessary to differentiate between two types of collective obligations:
corporate obligations that fall on the “collective as a whole” (without separating
the actors that belong to it), and shared obligations where bearers are autonomous
members of a collective.123 IGOs and NSAs bear corporate obligations. A group
of independent collaborating actors, such as U.N. member states, are bound by
shared extraterritorial obligations.
Several interconnected issues related to multiple actors’ extraterritorial
obligations are in the spotlight of contemporary discussions. In particular, it is
widely debated whether IGOs, NSAs, and individuals can be bound by
extraterritorial human rights obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights,
especially by global obligations, notwithstanding the fact that only states are
parties to most human rights treaties.124 It is also debated whether global actors
should be directly accountable for their failure to implement these obligations or
whether obligations should run, in the first instance, through states as primary
duty-bearers. The following two Subsections suggest answers to these questions.

1. What is the Normative
Extraterritorial Obligations?

Framework

of

Global

Actors’

The traditional interpretation of states as the only (or the primary) bearers
of human rights obligations is inadequate.125 The following analysis turns to the
normative foundations for human rights obligations of global actors other than
states. Specifically, it considers: (1) core international human rights instruments;
(2) customary international law; (3) jus cogens; and (4) self-regulatory soft law
instruments.
122

123

For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the International Labour Organization
(ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
On collective obligations see Roland Pierik, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A NormativePhilosophical Analysis, in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43–50 (André
Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs eds., 2015).
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IGOs may also be parties to legally binding international human rights treaties. For instance, the
EU is a party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

125

See also CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 7; Vandenhole, supra note 18, at 1; VANDENBOGAERDE, supra
note 6, at 6–14; Peters, supra note 28, at 155.
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First, some core international human rights instruments recognize IGOs,
NSAs, and individuals as bearers of human rights obligations. For example, the
UDHR proceeds from the assumption that not just states but “every individual
and every organ of society” should strive to promote respect for human rights and
to “secure their universal and effective recognition and observance” through
progressive national and international measures.126 According to the UDHR,
“everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.”127 It also requires states, individuals,
and groups to refrain from violations of human rights and freedoms set forth in
the Declaration.128 This requirement is reaffirmed by the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).129 Though the ICESCR and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) focus on states’ obligations, the
bodies aimed at monitoring the implementation of these treaties—the Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR)130 and the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (U.N. CRC)131—clarify that socio-economic rights bind other
global actors (IGOs, NSAs, and individuals) as well. Relatedly, the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) determines states’ obligations to

126

UDHR, supra note 2, at pmbl.

127

Id. at art. 29, ¶ 1.
Id. at art. 30.

128
129
130

131

ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 5, ¶ 1.
See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate
Food (Art. 11), ¶¶ 36, 38, 40, U.N. Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter CESCR Gen.
Comment No. 12]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 14: The Right
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), ¶¶ 45, 63, U.N Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug.
11, 2000) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights,
Gen. Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), ¶ 38, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 15]; Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the
Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic
Production of which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, ¶ 1 (c), of the Covenant), ¶¶ 61, 8240,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 17]; Comm.
on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 18: The Right to Work (Art. 6 of the
Covenant), ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment
No. 18]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment 19: The Right to Social Security
(Art. 9), ¶ 61., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No.
19]. See also The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex (1987)
[hereinafter Limburg Principles], reprinted in The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 122, 126–27 (1987).
See, for example, Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined third
to sixth periodic reports of Guinea, ¶¶ 14–15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GIN/CO/3-6 (2019); Comm.
on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic
reports of Japan, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/JPN/CO/4-5 (2019).
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cooperate with international and regional organizations and civil society.132 The
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the Declaration on the Right
and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also
bring attention to the importance of international cooperation and obligations of
individuals, social groups, institutions, and NGOs in promoting the right to a
social and international order in which human rights are fulfilled.133
Second, despite the fact that customary international law remains statefocused, it also provides a legal basis for extraterritorial obligations, including
global obligations, of multiple actors. Custom is traditionally interpreted through
two elements: (1) frequent and consistent practice and (2) opinio juris—an
expressed belief that this practice realizes legal obligations, in particular, in
international hard and soft law instruments.134 Contemporary opinio juris formed
by soft law instruments recognizes the human rights obligations of IGOs and
NSAs. For example, the UDHR, which is generally considered to be an important
part of customary international law,135 acknowledges global human rights
obligations of individuals and “organs of society” corresponding to two important
entitlements: the entitlement to the realization of socio-economic rights
indispensable for the enjoyment of human dignity universally (Art. 22) and the
132.
133

G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 32, ¶ 1 (Jan. 24, 2007).
G.A. Res. 48/12, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, art. 13 (Jul. 12, 1993); G.A. Res.
53/144, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society
to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, pmbl.,
art. 18.3 (Dec. 9, 1998), http://perma.cc/TMU3-RAZJ [hereinafter Declaration on the Right and
Responsibility].

134

While traditional approaches to customary international law emphasize the significance of practice,
modern approaches give precedence to opinio juris. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757–58 (2001);
OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY
63–64 (2014); SKOGLY, supra note 11, at 109–10. Frederic Kirgis places these two elements at
different ends of a sliding scale and argues that the more frequent and consistent the practice, the
less evidence of opinio juris is necessary for the establishment of a custom and vice versa. Frederic L.
Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 149 (1987).

135

There is, however, a debate about whether customary international law covers the entire UDHR or
only its particular norms, especially whether socio-economic rights and corresponding obligations
are integrated into it. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 100–02 (1988–89); LOUIS HENKIN, THE
AGE OF RIGHTS 19 (1990); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and International Law, 3 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS.: AN INT’L J. 144 (1998); Olivier De
Schutter, The Status of Human Rights in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 39, 41 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009); CLAPHAM, supra note
25, at 86; SKOGLY, supra note 11, at 110. The Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter) and the
ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles) regulating
states’ extraterritorial obligations are also often acknowledged as part of customary international
law.
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entitlement to a just global order in which these rights can be fully realized (Art.
28).136
In addition, the Millennium Development Goals (particularly Goal 8, which
demands the “develop[ment of] a global partnership for development”) and the
Sustainable Development Goals (especially Goal 17, which requires the
“strengthen[ing of] the means of implementation and revitaliz[ation of] the global
partnership for sustainable development”) reinforce the intention of states and
other members of the global community to cooperate for the realization of
essential social and economic interests of individuals. In particular, they emphasize
the global commitments of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, guaranteeing
secure access to food, water, sanitation, health care, and basic education for all,
which are also objects of basic socio-economic rights.137
At the same time, there is no consensus on the status of global obligations.
Despite the fact that members of the international community have repeatedly
demonstrated their intention to contribute to global poverty eradication within
the framework of both human rights and development agendas, developed states,
IGOs, and NSAs have unambiguously expressed reluctance to bind themselves
with legal instruments regulating global obligations, especially obligations to assist
in the realization of socio-economic rights.138 Therefore, according to
contemporary opinio juris, global obligations represent voluntary commitments
rather than human rights-based obligations. The same trend can be found in the
practice of the implementation of global obligations by various actors.139 This
implies an intermediate conclusion that global obligations form a part of
customary international law only as voluntary self-obligations of various global
actors rather than human rights obligations.140
Third, jus cogens, the preemptory norms of international law overriding all
other legal sources, are not only binding on states, but also on IGOs, NSAs, and
individuals. Jus cogens embrace fundamental, or core, human rights that are
136

See Section IV.B below.

137

See Philip Alston, A Human Rights Perspective on the Millennium Development Goals, Paper prepared as a
contribution to the work of the Millennium Project Task Force on Poverty and Economic
Development, ¶¶ 41–42, 48; Gobind Nankani et al., Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Strategies:
Moving Towards Convergence? in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL
REINFORCEMENT 475 (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005); CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 86–
87.

138

Alston, supra note 137, at ¶ 42.
On the practice of the realization of international obligations to assist, see Pribytkova, supra note
78, at 300–330.
See Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate
Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755, 778 (2005); Alston,
supra note 137, at ¶¶ 42, 48.

139

140
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addressed to all global actors.141 Although there have been doubts in literature
about the potential of socio-economic rights to become a part of jus cogens,142
several scholars maintain that, as a necessary condition for the realization of jus
cogens human rights (for example, the right to life), basic socio-economic rights,
and corresponding obligations, should receive the status of jus cogens norms.143
Fourth, an increasing number of global actors take on extraterritorial
obligations by joining or adopting self-regulatory soft law instruments. Prominent
examples of such self-regulatory instruments are international framework
agreements and corporate codes of conduct.144
Based on this brief analysis of the normative foundations for human rights
obligations of global actors, it is clear that contemporary international human
rights law recognizes that human rights give rise to corresponding obligations not
only of states, but also of other global actors. This concerns negative obligations
to respect human rights, whereas positive global obligations to protect and fulfill
socio-economic rights are interpreted as self-commitments of members of the
international community.

2. How are Extraterritorial Obligations of Various Actors Regulated?
This Subsection briefly outlines the current legal regime regulating
extraterritorial human rights obligations of states, IGOs, NSAs, and individuals,
while also pointing out existing gaps in this regime. It does not attempt, however,
to propose principles for attributing particular global obligations to these different
categories of entities. That is a research agenda that requires further careful
attention beyond the scope of this Article.
First, states. As key agents in the international arena, states play several roles
and are bound by three types of extraterritorial obligations: (1) direct
extraterritorial obligations; (2) obligations as members of IGOs; and (3)
obligations to regulate and influence the conduct of NSAs and individuals.
(1) Recognizing direct extraterritorial obligations of states requires rethinking the
concept of jurisdiction, which signifies a certain normative relationship between
141

142

143

144

See International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, art. 50, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (1966).
See, for example, Predrag Zenović, RGSL Research Papers, No. 6: Human Rights Enforcement via Peremptory
Norms – a Challenge to State Sovereignty 36–37 (2012).
See, for example, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 36 (Francisco
Forrest Martin et al. eds., 2006).
See, for example, Lisa R. Price, International Framework Agreement: A Collaborative Paradigm for Labor
Relations, in OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 241
(2006); Fiona McLeay, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational
Corporations: A Small Piece of a Larger Puzzle, in OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 219 (2006).
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states and individuals.145 International public law proceeds from a presumption,
particularly expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that
international treaties are binding upon state parties within their territory.146 There
are no jurisdictional restrictions in the ICESCR that explicitly recognizes that
states have extraterritorial obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights
while mentioning their obligations of international assistance and cooperation. 147
However, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which allows the bringing of
individual complaints to the consideration of the CESCR, uses the criterion of
jurisdiction.148 According to the case law of U.N. treaty bodies, states’ jurisdiction
extends to situations when they exercise effective territorial and personal control,
as well as when there is a causal link between their activity and human rights
impacts.149 Article 2 of the ICESCR also implies that states’ jurisdiction embraces
situations where they act for the realization of socio-economic rights universally.150
Though a binding human rights instrument regulating states’ extraterritorial
obligations is still lacking, the Maastricht Principles and accompanying
commentaries provide a systematic explication of states’ extraterritorial
obligations in the area of socio-economic rights.151
145

146
147
148

149

150

151

It is customary to classify several dimensions of jurisdiction: subject-matter jurisdiction; territorial
jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction; and temporal jurisdiction.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 29, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 2.
G.A. Res. 63/117, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, art. 2 (Mar. 5, 2009).
In concluding observations on Israel, the CESCR asserted that jurisdiction includes all territories
and populations under states’ effective control. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Report
on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions, ¶ 234, U.N. Doc. E/1999/22, E/C.12/1998/26
(1999). According to the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), which considers individual
complaints for violations of human rights recognized in the ICCPR, jurisdiction concerns the links
between individuals and states relating to human rights violations. See HRC, Delia Saldias de Lopez
v. Uruguay, Communication App. No. 52/1979, ¶ 12.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984). See also
HRC, Gen. Comment No. 36, on the Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶¶ 26, 66, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018). The European Court
of Human Rights came to the same conclusion about states’ jurisdiction. See, for example, Al-Jedda
v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and
Russia, App. No. 43370/04; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05.
U.N. treaty-based bodies, the CESCR, the U.N. CRC, and the CEDAW demand that states do not
violate socio-economic rights abroad as well as implement their global obligations. See, for example,
Comm. on. Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of
Germany, ¶¶ 8–9, 12–15, 20–21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/DEU/CO/6 (2018); Comm. on the Rights of
the Child, Combined fourth and fifth reports submitted to the CRC by Singapore under article 44
of the Convention, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SGP/4-5 (2017); Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of Norway,
¶ 14–15, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/9 (2017).
For an analysis of lacunas in the Maastricht Principles, see Section IV.A.
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(2) States also bear extraterritorial obligations as members of IGOs. In several
General Comments, the CESCR notes that states “have an obligation to ensure
that their actions as members of intergovernmental organizations, including
international financial institutions, take due account” of basic socio-economic
rights.152 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights specify that states are responsible for “violations resulting from
the programmes and policies of the organizations of which they are members.”153
Since there are currently no mechanisms for holding IGOs directly accountable
for their violations of socio-economic rights, researchers and practitioners
propose bringing to account states that play key roles in the decision-making of
these organizations.154 This Article advocates the recognition of IGOs’ direct
accountability.
(3) In the contemporary state-centered international order, states are
expected to regulate and influence the conduct of NSAs and individuals.155 The CESCR
and the U.N. CRC, however, require states to regulate NSAs primarily as part of

152

153

154

155

See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 13: The Right to Education
(Art. 13), ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment
No. 13]; CESCR Gen. Comments No. 12, 14, and 18, supra note 130. Cf. the ETO Consortium,
supra note 7 (principle 15 of the Maastricht Principles) (“As a member of an international
organization, the State remains responsible for its own conduct in relation to its human rights
obligations within its territory and extraterritorially. A State that transfers competences to, or
participates in, an international organization must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the
relevant organization acts consistently with the international human rights obligations of that
State.”). The CESCR also requires states to report on how their participation in the decision-making
and norm-setting of IGOs affects the enjoyment of socio-economic rights world-wide. See
Guidelines on treaty-specific documents to be submitted by states parties under articles 16 and 17
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 3(c), E/C.12/2008/224
(Mar. 2009).
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691,
698 (1998).
See, for example, FONS COOMANS & ROLF KÜNNEMANN, CASES AND CONCEPTS ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
52–61 (2012).
See International Law Commission, ILC Articles, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (the ILC
Articles); ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 26 of the Maastricht Principles); U.N. Guiding
Principles, supra note 16; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 24 on
State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the
context of business activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017) [hereinafter CESCR Gen.
Comment No. 24]. States’ obligations to regulate and influence the conduct of NSAs and
individuals should not be confused with states’ responsibility for the conduct of NSAs and
individuals in cases when the latter are directed and controlled by the state. International Law
Commission, supra note 141, at art. 8. Cf. ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 12 of the
Maastricht Principles).
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their territorial, rather than extraterritorial, obligations.156 These requirements
often exceed the ability of developing countries to control more powerful NSAs,
especially TNCs, affiliated with developed states. Commentators draw attention
to the fact that the CESCR’s emphasis on obligations of home states to protect
their citizens from the negative impact of global actors157 does not promote the
acceptance of these actors’ direct obligations, nor does it promote obligations of
the states with which they are affiliated.158 U.N. treaty bodies have only recently
begun requiring states to govern the extraterritorial conduct of TNCs registered
or domiciled in their territory.159
Second, intergovernmental organizations, which consist of member states,
represent organizations “established by a treaty or other instrument governed by
international law and possessing [their] own international legal personalit[ies].”160
IGOs, especially financial institutions, command great resources and power
without adequate accountability.161 Presently, there are neither binding legal
instruments regulating direct human rights obligations of IGOs162 nor
international bodies with jurisdiction to hold IGOs directly accountable for their
failure to implement their human rights obligations. Additionally, IGOs usually
enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of domestic accountability mechanisms. 163

156

157

158
159

160
161

162

163

See, for example, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the Fifth
Periodic report of Columbia, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/COL/CO/5 (2010); Comm. Rights Child,
Concluding observations on the Third and Fourth Periodic report of Sri Lanka, ¶¶ 18–19, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/LKA/CO/3-4 (2010).
See, for example, CESCR Concluding observations on Congo, supra note 102, at ¶ 3; Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the Second Periodic report of Cuba, ¶ 21, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/CUB/CO.2 (2011).
VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6, at 78.
See, for example, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the fourth
periodic report of New Zealand, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/NZL/CO/4 (2018); Comm. on
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations on the combined eighth
and ninth periodic reports of Canada, ¶¶ 18–19, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CAN/8-9 (2016).
Draft Articles on International Organizations, supra note 16, art. 2(a).
See, for example, Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human
rights, the World Bank and human rights, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. A/70/274 (2015) [hereinafter The World
Bank and Human Rights]; Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and
human rights, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in relation to social protection,
¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/33 (2018) [hereinafter The Role of the IMF].
The Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations deal with international
organizations’ breaches of international obligations determined as acts which are “not in conformity
with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of the origin or character of the obligation
concerned” (art. 10), that is, this includes violations of global human rights obligations. Draft
Articles on International Organizations, supra note 16.
For discussion of the U.N. immunity, see Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extreme poverty and human rights, U.N. responsibility for the introduction of cholera into Haiti,
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The CESCR requires states to implement human rights in cases of their
membership in or cooperation with IGOs. It focuses, therefore, on territorial and
extraterritorial obligations of states, without due regard to direct obligations of
IGOs themselves.164 The recognition of the responsibility of participating states
for actions or omissions of IGOs is insufficient, especially when states have
limited control over IGOs’ activities.165
According to the traditional view, IGOs are only bound by duties to respect
human rights, with some limited obligations to protect them, whereas the duty to
fulfill human rights is beyond their concern. The Tilburg Guiding Principles on
the World Bank, IMF and Human Rights,166 as well as some researchers and
practitioners,167 voice this view about the Bretton Woods Institutions. Conversely,
the Maastricht Principles, which are, by their terms, applicable to IGOs, provide
that IGOs are bound by extraterritorial obligations, including global obligations
to respect, protect, and fulfill socio-economic rights.168
Third, non-state actors are collective entities that are not states, do not consist
of states, and are not directed or funded by states.169 They include, but are not
limited to, TNCs, NGOs, religious groups, media organizations, as well as
paramilitary and armed resistance groups. This Subsection considers TNCs in
particular, as they are major global actors and frequent violators of human rights
worldwide. They form a salient example for framing the broader question of
whether NSAs should be recognized as bearers of global human rights obligations.
TNCs’ extraterritorial obligations are regulated by soft law instruments.170 A

164

165

U.N. Doc. A/71/367 (2016); José Enrique Alvarez, The U.N. in the Time of Cholera, 108 AM. J. INT’L
L. UNBOUND 22, 24–25 (2014–15).
See, for example, CESCR Gen. Comments No. 12, 14, 18, supra note 130; CESCR Gen. Comment
No. 13, supra note 152.
See VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6, at 72.

166

“As international legal persons, the World Bank and the IMF have international legal obligations to
take full responsibility for human rights respect in situations where the institutions’ own projects,
policies or programmes negatively impact or undermine the enjoyment of human rights.” Tilburg
Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 250.

167

See SKOGLY, supra note 8. Mac Darrow asserts that obligations of the World Bank and the IMF to
fulfill may also arise, especially in the context of cooperation with human rights organs, though he
does not specify them. MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 131–33 (2003).

168

ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 16 of the Maastricht Principles).
For definition, see, for example, CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 25; Peters et al., supra note 109, at 14.

169
170

See, for example, U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 16; U.N. Subcomm. on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, art. 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Norms]; U.N. Global Compact,
http://perma.cc/5GYN-SS8G; OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2001);
International Organization for Standardization, ISO 26000 Social Responsibility (2010),
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special U.N. Human Rights Council open-ended intergovernmental working
group has been mandated to elaborate a Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate,
in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises (Legally Binding Instrument).171 One of the most
debated questions in this context is whether extraterritorial obligations of TNCs
extend beyond obligations to respect.172
Two significant international instruments provide distinct answers to this
question. The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (U.N.
Guiding Principles) limit extraterritorial obligations of TNCs to the obligation to
respect,173 while the obligation to regulate and influence their activity falls on the
state.174 This minimalistic interpretation of TNCs’ direct obligations has been
criticized by experts.175 Though the U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights (U.N. Norms) also reaffirm the primary obligations of states, they
recognize that “within their respective spheres of activity and influence,
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to
promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized
in international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of
indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.”176 The U.N. Norms
acknowledge that TNCs, “as organs of society,” are responsible for “promoting
http://perma.cc/E83C-NT3E; International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (2017).
171

172

173

174
175

176

See Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL,
http://perma.cc/N6DJ-XBVG.
See, for example, Alston & Robinson, supra note 137; David Bilchitz, Do Corporations Have Positive
Fundamental Rights Obligations?, 57 THEORIA 1 (2010); HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS:
BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013)
[hereinafter OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS]; BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
CONTEXT AND CONTOURS (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2017) [hereinafter BUILDING A
TREATY].
U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 13 (principle 11). At the same time, in the U.N. Guiding
Principles, the obligation to respect is specified not only as avoiding causing human rights violations
or contributing to them through transnational corporation’s own activities, but also as preventing
or mitigating violations “directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business
relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.” Id. at 14–15 (principle 13).
Id. at 3–12 (principles 1–10).
See, for example, OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS, supra note 172; BUILDING A TREATY, supra note 172;
FLORIAN WETTSTEIN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTION (2009) [hereinafter MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS]; Florian Wettstein, CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great
Divide, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739 (2012) [hereinafter CSR].
U.N. Norms, supra note 170, at art. 1 (emphasis added). For a comparative analysis of the U.N.
Norms and the U.N. Guiding Principles, see Vandenhole, supra note 6.
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and securing” human rights.177 In addition, some U.N. treaty bodies go beyond
the U.N. Guiding Principles, concluding that TNCs have a duty to protect human
rights.178
Though the U.N. Norms did not receive wide acceptance, the idea that
TNCs, as social entities or “organs of society,” should perform societal goals and,
therefore, contribute to the realization of shared global obligations corresponding
to socio-economic rights, is being developed by researchers and practitioners.179
This reasoning is supported by empirical evidence that TNCs have immense
resources and, consequently, the potential to promote global poverty eradication.
Since a revised draft of the Legally Binding Instrument presupposes that
business enterprises possess only obligations to respect human rights,180 the legal
recognition of TNCs’ positive obligations to contribute to the protection and
fulfillment of socio-economic rights is a task for the future development of human
rights law.
Fourth, individuals. Human rights-based cosmopolitanism builds on the
foundation that individuals should play the key role in the global domain as both
rights-holders and duty-bearers. In accordance with the UDHR, which recognizes
the human rights obligations of individuals, the Declaration on the Right to
Development (DRD) reaffirms that “the human person is the central subject of
the development process and that development policy should therefore make the
human being the main participant and beneficiary of development.”181
Individuals act in several roles and participate in several types of relations: in
horizontal relations with their compatriots as right-holders and duty-bearers and
with global actors as bearers of shared extraterritorial obligations; in vertical
relations with their state as right-holders; and in diagonal relations with global
actors as right-holders. There are two major “channels” for individuals to realize
177
178
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180
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U.N. Norms, supra note 170, at pmbl., arts. 13–14.
See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic report of
Ecuador, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ECU/431 (2010); Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Concluding observations on the Third and Fourth Periodic report of Sri Lanka, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/LKA/CO/3-4 (2010).
For example, David Bilchitz justifies positive obligations of corporations as both remedial
responsibilities and global obligations to assist. Bilchitz, supra note 172. See also Vandenhole, supra
note 6; MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 175; CSR, supra note 175; OBLIGATIONS OF
BUSINESS, supra note 172; BUILDING A TREATY, supra note 172.
U.N. OHCHR, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the
Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (July 16, 2019),
http://perma.cc/B5XP-FXCH.
G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on Right to Development, pmbl. (Dec. 4, 1986). The DRD
continues that “every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and
enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. Id. at art. 1.
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their human rights and obligations, namely, their state and (organizations of)
global civil society.
Within this analysis, how should we understand the place of the global
community as a collective subject of obligations? Two main entities interact within
the global community: the international community of states, which includes
states and IGOs, and the global civil society, which embraces NSAs and
individuals. The creation of an international community of states is one of the
main objectives of the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter). International
lawyer Andrew Clapham compares the growth of global civil society with
“bottom-up” globalization, which is a response to “top-down” globalization.182
He also shows that globalization has substantially limited states’ capacities to
respond to new world challenges. Since individuals are not able to count on the
protection and assistance of their governments, they are forced to mobilize for
common action in order to protect themselves against foreign states and NSAs
and to exercise their human rights.183 In this sense, global civil society is both a
very powerful actor that is in horizontal legal relations to other global actors and
an important medium through which fundamental interests and human rights of
individuals are presented and defended and through which shared extraterritorial
obligations of individuals may be implemented.
Based on the preceding analysis, this Article concludes that all global
actors—states, IGOs, NSAs, and individuals—should be recognized as primary
agents of global justice and duty-bearers of shared extraterritorial obligations,
including global obligations. Would this necessarily entail the decline of the state?
The recognition of the agency and shared obligations of other global actors would
change the alignment of forces in the global arena and abolish the state’s
monopoly as the primary agent of justice. This transition from a state-centered to
a human-centered world order would not, however, displace the weighty role of
the state. Instead, the state would be transformed into a kind of human rightsbased political union. Indeed, the proposed regime would strengthen the role of
the state, to the extent that it expands the state’s human rights obligations beyond
its territory and enhances the state’s accountability for violations of extraterritorial
obligations.

C. Two Types of Extraterritorial Obligations
This Section intends to differentiate the main types of extraterritorial
obligations. Legal and political philosophy and human rights law use a variety of
normative bases for attributing extraterritorial obligations to various actors.
182
183

CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 7.
Id.
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Political philosophers David Miller and Charles Beitz argue that, although each
principle for allocating human rights obligations may seem quite plausible by itself,
none can adequately embrace all types of transnational obligations of all global
actors.184 Thus, “a multi-principle theory” that harmonizes different normative
bases should be formulated, and an order for applying these bases should be
defined.185 Following this advice, this Section considers major grounds for
extraterritorial human rights obligations and determines their interrelation and
hierarchy.
The primary criterion applied for distinguishing between various types of
extraterritorial obligations in legal literature and practice is the possibility of
establishing a causal link between acts/omissions of various actors and human
rights abuses.186 On this basis, the Maastricht Principles classify two main types of
extraterritorial obligations: (1) “obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a
State” affecting the enjoyment of human rights abroad; and (2) “obligations of a
global character that are set out in the Charter of the United Nations and human
rights instruments to take action, separately, and jointly through international
cooperation, to realize human rights universally.”187 The obligations of the first
type are remedial responsibilities for a negative effect on the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights worldwide. A serious socio-economic deprivation of individuals
having no secure access to basic rights (when the harm cannot be attributed to
any particular actors or institutions) gives rise to extraterritorial obligations of the
second type—in other words, to global human rights obligations. Thus, the
Maastricht Principles combine various normative bases for attributing
extraterritorial obligations into two large categories—those relating to (1) cases
where causal links between acts/omissions of actors and human rights abuses can
be established (for example, historical injustice, caused harm, domination,
effective control, exploitation, misuse of shared natural resources); and (2) cases
where such links cannot be found (for example, solidarity, capacity to assist, and
ability to reform the international order)—without specifying the difference
between various normative bases within each of these categories. This Section
continues with an analysis of these two types of obligations.

184
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See David Miller, Distributing Responsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 453, 464 (2001); CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE
IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 170–71 (2009).
Though Miller focuses on remedial transnational responsibilities, his conception may be used for
attributing extraterritorial obligations of a non-remedial kind as well. He formulates a multiprinciple conception that combines four principles—causal responsibility, moral responsibility,
capacity, and community—of allocating remedial responsibilities. See Miller, supra note 184, at 464.
It is “legal” but not “factual” or “moral” causality that is relevant in this context. See Tony Honoré,
Causation in the Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Zalta et al. eds., 2010).
ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 8 of the Maastricht Principles).
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According to Miller’s important observation, the justificatory bases
underlying these two major types of extraterritorial obligations—which he terms
“backward-looking” and “forward-looking” theories188—concentrate on different
subjects: the human rights violators and the victims, respectively. Relatedly, they
concern two different questions: “Who is responsible for a human right abuse?”
and “Who is in a better position to assist the victims of human right violations?”189
Miller rightly argues that none of these theories is persuasive or sufficient in
isolation. While assigning obligations to particular perpetrators, “backwardlooking” theories do not necessarily guarantee that victims will receive an adequate
remedy and compensation when perpetrators are incapable of providing them,
especially when urgent measures are required. Perpetrators are not always the best
problem-solvers. Though “backward-looking” theories claim that an unjust global
institutional structure should be changed,190 they lack reasons for demanding the
creation of a new regulatory and institutional framework necessary for the
realization of the human right to a just global order. At the same time, a weakness
of the “forward-looking” account concerns its ignorance regarding how actors
responsible for human rights violations should be held accountable. It is both
important to protect victims and improve the global institutional order, as well as
to hold perpetrators accountable for their violations of basic socio-economic
rights and prevent future abuses. On this premise, a balance between the
“backward-looking” and “forward-looking” approaches should be sought, and the
right sequence in the application of remedial and global obligations should be
determined.191
Remedial extraterritorial obligations and global obligations are simultaneous
obligations that frequently overlap.192 The simultaneity of these obligations means
that they cannot be mutually discharged. Compensation for harm caused does not
relieve actors of their global obligations to realize basic socio-economic rights
universally. In the same vein, implementing global obligations (for example,

188

Miller, supra note 184, at 465–66. Different terminology is used in literature to describe these
conceptions: “deontological” and “consequentialist” (Roland Pierik); primary and secondary
(Stefan Gosepath); retrospective compensatory and perspective distributive (Onora O’Neill);
contribution-based and assistance-based (Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland). Roland Pierik,
supra note 121, at 56; O’Neill supra note 123; Stefan Gosepath, Deprivation and Institutionally Based
Duties to Aid, in DOMINATION AND GLOBAL POLITICAL JUSTICE. CONCEPTUAL, HISTORICAL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 257 (Barbara Buckinx et al. eds., 2015).
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Miller reduces global obligations to obligations of assistance, while this Article demonstrates that
the area of global obligations is much wider. See Miller, supra note 184.
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See, for example, WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 118–22.
Miller himself is rather a supporter of the priority of a “forward-looking” theory over the
“backward-looking.” Miller, supra note 184, at 461.
See De Schutter et al., supra note 15, at 1101.
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assisting the poor or undertaking human rights impact assessments (HRIAs)) does
not exempt actors from their remedial responsibility for the extraterritorial human
rights violations they have caused.
At the same time, remedial responsibilities should not be replaced by global
obligations. For example, the realization of remedial responsibilities to
compensate for harm should precede the implementation of global obligations to
assist.193 Human rights organizations and activists have documented many cases
in which global players have not recognized their responsibility for extraterritorial
violations of human rights and cannot be held legally accountable in the absence
of appropriate mechanisms.194 Meanwhile, these players trumpet their voluntary
“assistance” to the global poor, which is very modest compared to the harm they
have caused. Injustice, immorality, and negative consequences of these practices
for the global poor have been convincingly demonstrated by a wide range of
experts.195 Compensation to victims for harm should not be given under the guise
of “help.”196 Victims have the right to the truth about human rights violations that
should also be guaranteed in the extraterritorial context.197
Extraterritorial obligations of one type may arise from the non-fulfillment
of the obligation of the other type. For example, a refusal by the responsible actors
to compensate for harm caused may be a basis for other actors’ obligation to act
for the realization of the rights of the affected individuals (to protect them or
provide assistance). A failure to fulfill global obligations, in turn, may be a basis
for an obligation to compensate the injured individuals and/or other actors who
have provided assistance to the victims.
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In certain cases (when urgent help to the victims is necessary; or the responsible actors are unable
to provide compensation; or if the compensation is not provided in full and is insufficient to
guarantee the minimum socio-economic conditions of a decent life), remedial responsibilities of the
actors involved in extraterritorial human rights violations to compensate victims for the harm
caused by them may initially be performed by third parties in the form of global assistance, with the
consequent reimbursement of the costs of the provided assistance. See Pribytkova, supra note 78, at
262.
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For examples of these practices, see COOMANS & KÜNNEMANN, supra note 154.
See, for example, Thomas W. Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, 13 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY 189 (2007).
In case of human rights violation, harmful activities must be immediately stopped. See ETO
Consortium, supra note 7 (principles 13 & 14 of the Maastricht Principles); Olivier De Schutter, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Guiding principles on Human Rights Impact
Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (2001).
ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 38 of the Maastricht Principles).
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D. Obligations to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill Socio-Economic
Rights Universally
Contemporary legal philosophy and international human rights law apply a
tripartite theory of human rights obligations that distinguishes between
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill. This Section will discuss which of these
obligations are owed by various actors.
The tripartite theory of human rights obligations successfully overcomes the
classic dichotomy of positive and negative duties, while demonstrating that each
human right gives rise to both negative and positive obligations. For example,
Shue made a significant contribution to the development of the tripartite theory
by demonstrating that there are three kinds of duties corresponding to every
human right, including socio-economic rights: duties to avoid depriving, to
protect from deprivation, and to aid the deprived.198 Following the tripartite
theory, the CESCR distinguishes between obligations to respect, protect, and
fulfill (facilitate, provide, and promote) corresponding to socio-economic rights.199
It is disputed whether all global actors can be bearers of all three types of
duties. Current commentary and practice are highly skeptical about extending the
responsibility regimes of IGOs, NSAs, and individuals beyond obligations to
respect.200 This Article defends the position that all actors should possess certain
global obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill socio-economic rights.
First, all global actors should respect socio-economic rights. In other words,
they should avoid causing harm or creating “a real risk of nullifying or impairing
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially.”201 The
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, the CESCR’s Comments, and
the Maastricht Principles provide that states and other actors should cooperate in
order to implement their general obligations to respect socio-economic rights
internationally.202 The duty to avoid causing harm is a legal basis for the obligations
198
199

200
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See SHUE, supra note 43, at 60.
On the evolution of the tripartite theory, see MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS 157 (2003). On the application of the theory to obligations of international assistance and
cooperation, see Sepúlveda, supra note 11.
From Shue’s point of view, various actors are bound by different combinations of obligations
corresponding to basic socio-economic rights: while duties to avoid depriving bind all actors
(individuals and social institutions), duties to protect and to aid should only be implemented by
special social institutions. See SHUE, supra note 43, at 60.
See ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 13 of the Maastricht Principles).
See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, art. 4 (2001); CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 130, at ¶ 39; CESCR Gen.
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to undertake ex ante HRIAs and human rights due diligence (HRDD) as tools of
identifying and measuring potential effects of multiple actors’ acts/omissions on
the enjoyment of socio-economic rights.203 Both (potential) victims and citizens
of a home state have the right to demand that HRIAs and HRDD be conducted
and to participate in them.204
Second, the CESCR recognizes states’ obligations to protect socio-economic
rights abroad.205 According to the Maastricht Principles, states have separate and
joint obligations to regulate and influence the conduct of individuals and NSAs—
including TNCs—in order to prevent their abuses of human rights
extraterritorially. The obligations to protect also include measures to hold
violators accountable, and to ensure an effective remedy for victims.206 As Shue
suggests, duties to protect comprise interactional obligations to enforce duties to
respect, as well as institutional obligations to create and maintain efficient national
and international mechanisms (including accountability bodies) necessary for the
realization of obligations to protect.207 Not just states, but also IGOs and NSAs
should take an active role in implementing obligations to protect,208 in particular
creating non-judicial mechanisms as well as conducting ex post HRIAs.209
Third, global obligations to fulfill socio-economic rights combine obligations to
facilitate, provide, and promote.210 Extraterritorial obligations to facilitate require
creating and maintaining a global institutional scheme enabling individuals to
enjoy their basic socio-economic rights worldwide. Extraterritorial obligations to
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Comment No. 15, supra note 130, at ¶ 31; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 19, supra note 130, at ¶ 53;
ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 19 of the Maastricht Principles).
See ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 14 of the Maastricht Principles); U.N. Guiding
Principles, supra note 16, at 15–23 (principles 15, 17-21).
See Alexandra Eberhard et al., Human Rights Impact Assessments: Human Rights Clinic Report (2015),
http://perma.cc/R862-RWWH.
See CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 130, at ¶ 39; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 15, supra
note 130, at ¶ 33 (2003); CESCR Gen. Comment No. 19, supra note 130, at ¶ 54 (2008).
See ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principles 23–27 of the Maastricht Principles).
See SHUE, supra note 43, at 62; see also Alston, supra note 137, at ¶ 6.4.
Cf. regulation of IGOs’ obligations to protect through the Maastricht Principles (principle 16) and
TNCs’ obligations to protect through the U.N. Norms (art. 1) (Section III.B(2) above).
For example, grievance mechanisms created by the World Bank (Inspection Panel), the UNDP and
the UNEP (Stakeholder Response Mechanisms). National Contact Points established in accordance
with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises represent important non-judicial
complaint procedures for individuals and communities whose human rights are violated by TNCs.
See The World Bank, How to File a Complaint (Request for Inspection), http://perma.cc/NJ3J-MKP7;
UNDP, Stakeholder Response Mechanism, http://perma.cc/Q3ZF-8D76; UNEP, UNEP’s
environmental, social and economic sustainability: Stakeholder response mechanism, http://perma.cc/KSW3G9F7; OECD Watch, National Contact Points (NCPs), http://perma.cc/ETL7-75TD.
See SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 199, at 239.
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promote involve ensuring access to educational programs, knowledge, and
information about socio-economic rights globally, and encouraging governments
to guarantee this access at the national level. Global obligations to provide
presuppose guaranteeing access to resources and services indispensable for
leading a decent life to those who are unable to secure this access by themselves.
The core international human rights instruments recognize states’ global
obligations to fulfill.211 This Article argues that the shared obligations to facilitate,
promote, and provide bind not only states, but all members of the international
community. As demonstrated in Section III.B, global obligations to fulfill have
not yet received international legal recognition. However, there have been
attempts to regulate various global actors’ obligations to fulfill through some soft
law instruments. For example, according to the Maastricht Principles, states and
IGOs are bound by global obligations to fulfill socio-economic rights.212
Additionally, the U.N. Norms presuppose TNCs’ obligations to promote and
“secure the fulfilment of” human rights “within their respective spheres of activity
and influence.”213 Although the U.N. Norms have not been accepted
internationally, they exercise influence over the theory and practice of human
rights.214
Many scholars and practitioners consider obligations to respect and protect
socio-economic rights territorially and extraterritorially to be similar and
simultaneous obligations.215 At the same time, they point out that extraterritorial
obligations to fulfill differ from territorial obligations because (1) they are
complementary (or subsidiary) in respect to territorial obligations, and (2) they
only bind those actors that are “in a position to assist.”216 This view rests on the
211
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See UDHR, supra note 2, at arts. 22, 28. ICESCR, supra note 27, at arts. 2, 11. The CESCR
acknowledges that global obligations of cooperation and assistance in the realization of socioeconomic rights, in particular related to key components of the right to an adequate standard of
living—the rights to adequate food, water, sanitation, housing, and health —are legal obligations of
states (see Section IV.D below).
ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principles 16, 28–35 of the Maastricht Principles).
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U.N. Norms, supra note 170, at art. 1. Due to their sphere of competence, TNCs are capable of
securing access to objects of basic socio-economic rights (such as food, water, essential medication,
books and other educational materials and programs, and computer technologies). Moreover,
TNCs can use their influence in international decision-making, norm-setting, and institutiondesigning processes to contribute to creating and maintaining a just global order, in which the
universal realization of socio-economic rights is guaranteed.
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See Section III.B(2) above.
Vandenbogaerde, supra note 21, at 241; KHALFAN, supra note 9, at 331; Wouter Vandenhole &
Wolfgang Benedek, Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide, in GLOBAL
JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2013).
KHALFAN, supra note 9, at 331; Vandenhole & Benedek, supra note 215, at 338.
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misunderstanding that global obligations are always distributive and interactional
obligations of assistance. However, giving concurrent consideration to the
institutional and relational aspects of global obligations allows for a different
conclusion. Global institutional obligations to fulfill are primary and simultaneous
obligations. The degree of implementation of global obligations in a specific
context is dependent on actors’ capacities, but availability of resources does not
affect the presence or absence of global obligations.217 Members of the
international community, lacking sufficient resources, are not exempt from
contributing to implementing global obligations. Moreover, they are obliged to
cooperate in order to find and multiply available means and resources. Hence, a
“position to assist” is not an appropriate normative basis for allocating global
obligations.218

E. Summary
The recognition, conceptualization, and implementation of extraterritorial
obligations of multiple actors is an important precondition for the “quantum leap”
from a regime of international justice to one of global justice and from a statecentered to human-centered global order. This transition would not diminish the
important role of the state, but rather mark its reformation into a human rightsbased political union (Section III.A). The state and civil society should remain two
important “channels” for representing interests and protecting human rights of
individuals in the global domain. Two types of extraterritorial obligations—
remedial extraterritorial responsibilities and global obligations—are simultaneous,
frequently overlap, and may arise from the non-fulfillment of obligations of the
other type (Section III.C). All global actors—states, IGOs, NSAs, and
individuals—should be recognized as primary agents of global justice (Section
III.B) and duty-bearers of global obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill socioeconomic rights (Section III.D).

IV. G LOBAL H UMAN R IGHTS O BLIGATIONS
This Section outlines a concept of global human rights obligations and teases
out the major inconsistencies of traditional views on such obligations (Section
IV.A). To explain the nature and content of global obligations, it defends basic
equality as their foundational principle (Section IV.B), and, on that ground,
considers what human rights obligations should be ensured in the domains of
global relational (Section IV.C) and distributive (Section IV.D) justice.
217
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See Limburg Principles, supra note 130, at principle 23; Arjun K. Sengupta, Study on the Current
State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Development, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2 (June 27, 1999).
For details, see Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 289.
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A. Common Prejudices about Global Obligations
Unlike remedial extraterritorial obligations that presuppose a causal link
between multiple actors’ acts or omissions and individuals’ inability to enjoy socioeconomic rights, global obligations bind subjects (right-holders and duty-bearers)
that are not involved in any legally relevant causal relations.
The legal theory of global obligations is in its embryonic stage. This Article
proceeds to delineate its main contours, starting from common prejudices about
global obligations, which this Section aims to correct. Some of these prejudices
are expressed in the Maastricht Principles, which are still the only (soft) law
document that has acknowledged states’ global obligations and represent the
prevailing interpretation of global obligations. As mentioned in Section I, the
concept of global obligations is not sufficiently developed in the Maastricht
Principles and the comments to them, as they pay more attention to remedial
extraterritorial obligations. The interpretation they offer is limited in several
respects: (1) they concentrate only on states’ extraterritorial obligations (though
claiming to be applicable to IGOs as well), whereas global obligations of NSAs
and individuals fall beyond their scope; (2) they fail to overcome a state-centered
view on global obligations; (3) they leave open issues surrounding a normative
basis for, and status of, global obligations; and (4) they treat global obligations as
obligations of conduct rather than obligations of result, which leads to inadequate
understandings of their content and scope. This Section takes a closer look at
these lacunae and ways to fill them.
First, as demonstrated, the bearers of global obligations are not only states
but also IGOs, NSAs, and individuals. The Maastricht Principles should,
therefore, be supplemented by instruments regulating direct global obligations of
actors other than states.219 In particular, an important role should be played by the
Legally Binding Instrument.
Second, the Maastricht Principles fail to overcome a state-centered view of
global obligations. This results not only from their focus on the duties of the state
and IGOs, thereby bypassing obligations of NSAs and individuals. The statecentered approach manifests itself in the first instance through the Maastricht
Principles’ emphasis not on ensuring the enjoyment of socio-economic rights by
individuals, but on enabling states to realize their territorial obligations. For
example, it is states rather than individuals that are subjects of a legitimate request

219

On implementing the Maastricht Principles to regulate activities of other actors, see Ashfaq Khalfan
& Ian Seiderman, Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations: Wider Implications of the Maastricht Principles
and the Continuing Accountability Challenge, in CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTI DUTY-BEARER HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME (Wouter
Vandenhole ed., 2015).
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for, and recipients of, international assistance.220 A shift from a state-centered to
a human-centered global order requires the recognition of individuals as major
right-holders, which have justified claim-rights to social support and global
assistance as well as claim-rights to just local and global basic structures that are
directed to their own governments, other global actors, and the international
community as a whole.221
Third, the Maastricht Principles do not specify a legal basis for global
obligations.222 This, in turn, leaves open the question of the status of global
obligations. Principle 8 defines the legal basis of the obligations of a global
character quite broadly: global obligations are “set out in the Charter of the United
Nations and human rights instruments.”223 This Article develops an idea that
global obligations are human rights obligations based on two fundamental
entitlements enshrined in the UDHR: (1) the entitlement “to realization, through
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”;
and (2) the entitlement “to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”224 The latter
entitlement specifies the institutional nature of obligations and is an integral part
of the former. They both demonstrate the dual nature of global human rights
obligations, which include interactional obligations to realize socio-economic
rights universally and institutional obligations to create and maintain a just global
order.225 Though the right to a just global order is not explicitly enshrined in the
ICESCR and the CRC, the CESCR and the U.N. CRC recognize that their goals
include promoting a fair global structure necessary to ensure Conventions rights.
With these aims, they call for removing structural impediments to a just
international order and for creating the enabling environment (both a normative
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See ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principles 33–35 of the Maastricht Principles).
See TAN, supra note 28, at 71.
See Vandenhole, supra note 6. It is possible, however, that this task was intentionally reserved for
comments that can be considered an authentic interpretation, since they are made by the authors
of the Maastricht Principles. See De Schutter et al., supra note 15.
ETO Consortium, supra note 7 (principle 8 of the Maastricht Principles).
UDHR, supra note 2, at arts. 22, 28.
Cf. “the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be
fully realized.” Declaration on the Right and Responsibility, supra note 133, art. 18.3.
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and institutional structure) necessary for the universal realization of basic socioeconomic rights.226
Fourth, the Maastricht Principles treat global obligations as obligations of
conduct, addressing actors’ efforts and processes, rather than obligations of result,
which focus on the achievements and outcomes of actors’ activities.227 In
particular, they describe global obligations as obligations to “take action,” “take
steps,” “cooperate,” “assist,” “regulate,” and “influence” rather than obligations
to “realize,” “create,” “provide,” or “ensure.”228 Thus, obligations of international
cooperation and assistance, requiring only the undertaking of certain measures
rather than the achievement of certain goals (namely, the universal
implementation of basic socio-economic rights and the creation of a just global
order) come to the fore. The tendency to interpret global obligations as obligations
to cooperate and assist also prevails in contemporary legal discourse229 and
practice.230
This tradition is rooted in the U.N. Charter’s statement that the U.N.’s
ultimate purposes are developing “friendly relations among nations” and
achieving peaceful international co-operation,231 which are regarded as obligations
226

CESCR Gen. Comment No. 24, supra note 155, at ¶ 37 (Aug. 10, 2017); Comm. on the Rights of
the Child, Gen. Comment No. 24, Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/24,
¶ 29 (Sept. 18, 2019); see also Limburg Principles, supra note 130, at principle 30.

227

For this classification, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct: Some
Thoughts About the Implementation of International Obligations, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 363 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds.,
2010); Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156 (1987); SEPÚLVEDA,
supra note 199, at 184; SKOGLY, supra note 11, at 32–34. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill notes that formulating
obligations as those of conduct prevails in international relations, whereas domestic duties are more
frequently recognized as obligations of results. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Obligations of Conduct and
Result, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 112 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomaševski eds., 1984).
See, for example, ETO Consortium, supra note 7, (Parts III–V of the Maastricht Principles). Principle
8 defines global obligations as obligations “to take action, separately, and jointly through
international cooperation, to realize human rights universally”. Institutional global obligations are
also formulated as obligations of conduct: “States must take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps,
separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to create an international enabling
environment.” Id. at principle 29.
See for example, Sepúlveda, supra note 11; KARIMOVA, supra note 19; VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note
6.
See, for example, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 4, The Right to
Adequate Housing (art. 11(1) of the Covenant), ¶¶ 10, 13, 19, U.N. Doc. E/1993/23 (Dec. 13,
1991) [hereinafter CESCR Gen. Comment No. 4]; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 12, supra note 130,
at ¶¶ 36, 38, 40; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 38, 40, 45, 63; CESCR Gen.
Comment No. 15, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 30–38.
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“International co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
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of result. Other goals, including the realization of human rights, are, therefore,
subordinate to these ultimate purposes. The reasons for this interpretation are
quite understandable: the U.N. Charter was signed after the end of the Second
World War, on June 26, 1945. Hence, the Charter embodied the idea of peaceful
cooperation between countries, which was a fundamental international aim in the
post-War context. More than seventy years later, however, not merely peaceful
cooperation but also the creation of a just global order indispensable for the
realization of human rights should be recognized as an essential purpose of
(members of) the international community.232
The ICESCR also interprets global obligations as duties of conduct.233 The
CESCR, however, comments that general legal obligations corresponding to the
socio-economic rights recognized in the ICESCR include both duties of conduct
and duties of result. Although global obligations corresponding to socioeconomic rights are supposed to be implemented progressively, they aim at
achieving concrete results—the full realization of socio-economic rights
universally,234 and some global obligations are obligations of immediate effect.235
This Article suggests a new classification of global obligations. Under this
classification, global obligations in their interactional and institutional aspects
comprehend both duties of result (to realize socio-economic rights necessary for
the enjoyment of a decent standard of living worldwide and to create a just global
institutional structure indispensable for their realization) and duties of conduct (to
cooperate and to assist in the implementation of socio-economic rights).236
As mentioned in the previous Section, another common prejudice is the
belief that global obligations are secondary and consequent obligations, the

232
233

234

235

236

fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” U.N.
Charter, art. 1, ¶¶ 2–3. See also arts. 55–56.
See, for example, U.N., The Three Pillars of the United Nations, http://perma.cc/68YV-7XZC.
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures.” ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 2 ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 3, The Nature of States Parties’
Obligations (art 2., ¶ 1 of the Covenant), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter
CESCR Gen. Comment No. 3]; Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, supra note 153, at ¶ 8.
Applying the CESCR Gen. Comment No. 3 to extraterritorial obligations, those of immediate effect
are the following: aimed to eliminate discrimination; to “take steps,” in particular, to cooperate and
assist (¶ 2); minimum core obligations (¶ 10); relatively low-cost targeted programmes for
vulnerable individuals (¶ 12); obligations corresponding to socio-economic rights that are not
subject to progressive realization (¶ 5). CESCR Gen. Comment No. 3, supra note 234.
This Article focuses predominantly on global obligations of result; for a detailed analysis of global
obligations of conduct, see Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 222–333.
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implementation of which depends on whether and to what extent home states
have realized their territorial obligations.237 This position, however, is incorrect if
one considers institutional obligations corresponding to the human right to a just
global order, which are primary and simultaneous obligations of multiple actors.
This means that their realization is not related to the ability of a home state to
fulfill its territorial human rights obligations and that they should be implemented
in parallel to territorial obligations. Global institutional obligations include the
obligations: (1) to elaborate a normative framework regulating extraterritorial
obligations of multiple actors; (2) to create and maintain a system of institutions
necessary for removing structural impediments to a just global order and for the
implementation of global obligations; and (3) to develop monitoring and
accountability bodies, especially individual complaint mechanisms, at regional and
international levels to enforce effective and affordable remedies for socioeconomic rights violations universally.
Finally, global obligations are often unreasonably viewed predominantly as
duties of distributive justice.238 The following analysis seeks to discredit this
prejudice.

B. Basic, Relational, and Distributive Equality
To explain the nature and content of global obligations, this Section turns to
the concept of basic equality and its relational and distributive implications. As
Beitz rightly notes, “cosmopolitanism of any sort rests on a fundamental
commitment to treat all persons in some relevant sense as equals.”239 Basic
equality, which demands respect for and treatment of all individuals as equals in
human dignity and human rights, is a normative basis for obligations to implement
human rights universally. This Section demonstrates that it is the entitlement to
basic equality that is the actual foundation of global obligations in the domains of
relational and distributive justice.
It is possible to distinguish between three interrelated interpretations of
equality: (1) basic equality (or equality of status) that proceeds from the assumption
that people are equal holders of dignity and human rights; 240 (2) relational equality
that presupposes the relation of persons to each other as equals in particular

237

See, for example, BEITZ, supra note 184, at 106.

238

See, for example, BEITZ, supra note 43, at 125–53; WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 43–45; TAN,
supra note 28, at 19.

239

BEITZ, supra note 43, at 208.
For various conceptions of basic equality or equality of status, see David Miller, Equality and Justice,
10 RATIO 222 (1997); Richard J. Arneson, Egalitarianism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2013), http://perma.cc/UCY4-6PZR; WALDRON, supra note 33.
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contexts;241 and (3) distributive equality that requires individuals to have equal
amounts of something.242 Important aspects of these understandings of equality
and how they relate to global obligations are outlined below.
First, as Waldron shows, basic equality points to a special status of all persons
as members of humanity that is indivisible into “sorts” and “ranks.”243 Basic
equality is justified as both a thin (political) and thick (comprehensive) concept.
The political idea of basic equality is at the core of the conception of universal
human rights and has found its embodiment in the International Bill of Human
Rights. In this sense, Dworkin defended a fundamental “right to treatment as an
equal,” or the “right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration
of the political institutions that govern them,” as opposed to the derivative “right
to equal treatment.”244 This right should serve as a principle for ordering
institutions in both local and global domains. As a comprehensive idea, basic
equality is rooted in various philosophical, religious, moral, and cultural doctrines
from different epochs and schools of thought.245 For example, in A Writer’s Diary,
Fyodor Dostoevsky articulated foundational intuitions of basic equality as follows:
“I am in no way beneath thee in moral worth and . . . , as a person, I am equal to
thee.”246
Equality of status has several important features. First, it belongs to all
human beings (universality). Second, all persons are entitled to a status of moral
subjects irrespective of their social or financial state (unconditionality). Third, no
individual can be deprived, nor deprive themselves, of this status, even if their
troubled financial or social state is a result of their own choices (inalienability).
Finally, it presupposes all individuals’ ability to participate in all core social,
241

Different approaches to relational equality are suggested in Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of
Equality? 109 ETHICS 287 (1999); Samuel Scheffler, The Practice of Equality, in SOCIAL EQUALITY:
ESSAYS ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE EQUALS 21 (Carina Fourie et al. eds., 2015); Forst, supra note
44; THOMAS SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER? (2018).
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For an analysis of the difference between equality of status and distributive equality, see Elena
Pribytkova, A Decent Social Minimum as a Matter of Justice, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN POVERTY
ALLEVIATION 43 (Helmut Gaisbauer et al. eds., 2016).
WALDRON, supra note 33, at 6.

243
244

See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 218, 273; RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 411 (2002).

245

The idea of basic moral equality can be found in Rawls’ classification of two concepts of equality:
“equality as it is invoked in connection with the distribution of certain goods, some of which will
almost certainly give higher status or prestige to those who are more favored, and equality as it
applies to the respect which is owed to persons irrespective of their social position.” Rawls believed
that the second type of equality, basic equality, should be prioritized over distributive equality.
RAWLS, supra note 37, at 511.
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DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 512. Dostoyevsky can be considered the founder of moral-religious
tradition in Russian legal philosophy.
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political, and cultural institutions and practices of (global) society that influence
their human rights, and the enjoyment of secure access to shared material and
intellectual values (ability to be full-fledged members of a global society). Basic equality is a
fundamental entitlement of a person as a member of human society irrespective
of their role in a family, small social groups, or the state.
Grounded in cosmopolitan intuitions, human rights require that basic
equality transcends borders and is guaranteed to all individuals of the world.247
The idea of basic equality should guide extraterritorial relations, global normsetting, and institutional design.248 Since an extreme degree of inequality in
relationships between individuals and within distributive institutional schemes
worldwide casts doubt on the very possibility of the enjoyment of human dignity
and human rights, basic equality should precede and underpin spheres of relational
and distributive justice.
Second, relational equality approaches are built on opposition to distributive
egalitarianism.249 Defenders of these approaches seek to prove that equality is not
a distributive value but rather a relational one.250 In addition, they doubt that
distributive equality is valuable by itself. The value of any particular distributive
guarantee is determined based upon its ability to serve as a means to achieve a
society of equals.251
How do basic and relational equality interrelate? On the one hand, basic
equality and relational equality are closely interconnected252—they both demand
that individuals are treated and regarded as equals, in other words, with equal
concern and respect.253 Extremely unfair relations that divide people into classes
and make them feel like different kinds of human beings are incompatible with
basic equality. In this sense, the contemporary normative and institutional global
order favoring powerful actors and residents of rich countries at the cost of the
vast majority of the world’s population—while causing discrimination, social
exclusion, and marginalization of the latter—infringes on both relational and basic
equality.
247
248
249
250

251

252

253

TAN, supra note 28, at 1, 6, 10.
Pogge, supra note 28, at 49.
WALDRON, supra note 33, at 11.
See Anderson, supra note 241, at 313; Scheffler, supra note 241, at 22; SCANLON, supra note 241, at
1-10.
In view of this, “the relevant question in thinking about equality and distribution, is not ‘What is
the currency of which justice requires an equal distribution?’ It is rather ‘What kinds of distributions
are consistent with the ideal of a society of equals?” Scheffler, supra note 241, at 22.
Some researchers do not make a clear distinction between basic equality and relational equality.
Drawing the line between them allows casting light upon the nature of various types of global
obligations.
KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, RELATIONAL EGALITARIANISM: LIVING AS EQUALS 70 (2018).
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On the other hand, basic equality includes not only a relational (comparative)
component but also an absolute one, insofar as it proceeds from the recognition
of human dignity and human rights. Acknowledgement of an absolute value of a
person excludes so-called “leveling down” (equalization below a certain minimally
decent threshold).254 Relational equality, however, is per se fully compatible with
such leveling down: after all, individuals can consider each other equal members
of society even without having notions of dignity and human rights, or even when
outright rejecting these ideas (consider, for example, people in a primitive society
or a band of robbers). Therefore, an essential demand that basic equality imports
to the sphere of relational justice is to follow this absolute standard of humancentricity—the recognition of human dignity and human rights.255 In this respect,
basic equality represents the core principle of a global society of equals, which is
to be concretized in different contexts through the application of the norms of
relational justice.
Third, distributive equality requires persons to have equal amounts of
something (such as resources, social goods, income, or capabilities). Although
equality of status is interrelated with distributive equality, there is no direct
connection between them.256 Equal distribution of socially valuable goods or
resources is not a guarantee that people are regarded and treated as equals; and
contrariwise, even unequal distribution schemes do not prevent members of
society from enjoying equality of status.257 At the same time, distributive
inequalities tend to translate into both basic and relational inequality.258
The enjoyment of basic equality is impossible in the context of extreme
poverty. Hence, the current global order that causes (or allows) thousands of
deaths from poverty every day contradicts the very idea of equality of status.
Moreover, empirical evidence reveals that extreme distributive inequality
negatively affects the enjoyment of human dignity and fundamental human
254

255

256
257
258

On levelling down objection, see RAZ, supra note 91, at 227, 229, 235; Harry Frankfurt, Equality as
a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21 (1987).
Lippert-Rasmussen shows that even “extremely hierarchical social relations” may be consistent with
treating each other as moral equals, under conditions of respect for human dignity and human
rights. LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, supra note 253.
See Pribytkova, supra note 242, at 46.
See Arneson, supra note 240.
Political thinker Michael Walzer provides an excellent analysis of the conversion of inequalities
between various spheres of justice. He demonstrates that those having the edge (greater wealth or
higher power) in one area intend to utilize them for their domination in other areas as well, while
the worse off in one domain are also frequently disadvantaged in other domains. See generally
SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 42. Miller convincingly argues that Walzer’s idea should be read as
an idea about status. See David Miller, Complex Equality, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY 206
(David Miller & Michael Walzer eds., 1995). On inequality penetrating all aspects of life, see also
WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 203–05.
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rights.259 Widening inequalities of distribution facilitate the division of a global
society into first-class and second-class humans, which is incompatible with basic
equality.
Thus, a global distributive scheme that imposes extreme poverty undermines
the grounds for equality of status, while extreme distributive inequality has severe
negative consequences for both basic equality and relational equality.260 To achieve
basic equality, the global scheme must ensure minimum guarantees of protection
from poverty and extreme inequality, as well as secure access to a dignified
existence, as a matter of distributive justice.261
Understanding the differences between basic, relational, and distributive
equality is essential for grasping the nature and content of global obligations. As
this Section specifies, relational and distributive equality are not valuable per se.262
Inequalities in relations (for example, hierarchical subordination of employees or
military personnel) and distribution (for example, progressive taxation, positive
discrimination in favor of the most vulnerable individuals and social groups, or
social assistance to those in need) are morally and legally acceptable insofar as they
correspond to basic equality, with its recognition of the absolute value of
individuals, their human dignity and human rights. Neglect of basic equality means
trampling human dignity and human rights, which cannot be justified in the
modern world. It is, therefore, basic equality, and not relational or distributive
equality, that serves as the foundation of relational and distributive justice.263 Basic
equality is also a normative basis for global human rights obligations in the spheres
of relational and distributive justice.
To summarize, global human rights obligations aim to ensure certain
minimum guarantees in the domains of relational and distributive justice that are
essential for the enjoyment of basic equality as a core demand of global justice. As
the following Sections will demonstrate, the domain of relational justice should
259

For instance, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston,
provides an important overview of how extreme distributive inequalities in the global domain bring
about an unfair normative and institutional order that advantages the most powerful actors and has
“detrimental effects” on the enjoyment of human rights by others. Philip Alston, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, extreme inequality and human rights,
¶¶ 26–32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/31 (2015). See also generally MILANOVIC, supra note 35.
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The translatability of distributive inequalities into relational inequality is, however, indirect and
contextual. See Miller, supra note 240, at 224, 237.

261

I agree with Waldron that basic equality directly presupposes certain distributive guarantees. See
WALDRON, supra note 33, at 12.
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Cf. SCANLON, supra note 241; Frankfurt, supra note 254.
For the interrelation between equality and justice, see Miller, supra note 23; Miller, supra note 240.
It is necessary to clarify that the difference between institutional and interactional obligations
introduced in Sections II.C and IV.A should not be associated with the difference between the
domains of relational and distributive justice, each of which organizes the relationship and
implementation of institutional and interactional duties in its own way.
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realize global human rights obligations of multiple actors to create and maintain a
just institutional structure that ensures individuals’ full-fledged participation in it.
A global distributive scheme should embody the minimum human rights
guarantees of a dignified life (a decent social minimum) universally.

C. Global Obligations of Relational Justice
This Section addresses global obligations in the domain of relational justice
aimed at improving the contemporary global order, which is structurally unjust
and which severely infringes on basic equality and socio-economic rights. This
order is shaped by the most powerful actors (developed states, key IGOs, and
major TNCs) that exercise actual control over and benefit disproportionally from
core global institutions while leaving billions in poverty. Global rules and
principles governing the most significant areas of human life, including legal,
economic, political, social, and cultural spheres, disparately impact the poorest
individuals and societies.264
Global relational injustice manifests itself through rule-making and
institution-designing processes in world politics, international law, trade, and
finance. As the following (non-exhaustive) list of examples demonstrates, these
processes violate socio-economic rights.
First, developed states dominate in the decision-making processes of
international financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank.265
Despite their insistence on fidelity to human rights and the rule of law, these
institutions act “outside any global good governance regime for the protection of
the rights of those affected by their policies,”266 as evidenced by their longstanding and numerous socio-economic rights violations267 and the
impoverishment of individuals in developing countries.268
264
265

266

See TAN, supra note 28, at 25.
The Bretton Woods Institutions, which predominantly represent the developed North states, have
been criticized as neo-colonial institutions ignorant to the voices of developing countries. See, for
example, Report of the High-Level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development
on its Second Meeting, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/TF/3 (2005); Linah K. Mohohlo,
A Change in Mind-Set is Needed if Aid is to Remain Relevant, in THE DONORS’ DILEMMA: EMERGENCE,
CONVERGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN AID (Andy Sumner & Tom Kirk eds., 2014).
CLAPHAM, supra note 25, at 5.

267

See Alston’s critique of the Bretton Woods Institutions as a “human rights-free zone.” The World
Bank and Human Rights, supra note 161; The Role of the IMF, supra note 161.

268

The Structural Adjustment Programmes implemented by the IMF and the World Bank provided
loans to developing countries under harsh and detrimental conditions “often proved to have more
adverse consequences than the initial problem itself,” such as budget cuts for social services or
privatization of essential state-owned resources that allowed foreign investors, especially TNCs, to
become their owners. See Sachin Chaturvedi, The Development Compact: A Theoretical Construct for SouthSouth Cooperation, RIS Discussion Papers, Discussion Paper # 203 4 (2016); ISSA G. SHIVJI, SILENCES
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Second, the WTO’s non-transparent and unfair decision-making processes
are biased in favor of developed states and large TNCs and impose global rules
and institutions that negatively affect the enjoyment of human rights in developing
societies.269 Alleviating the WTO’s protectionism of developed states’ markets
would help several hundred million people escape from poverty by themselves.270
Third, cases relating to extraterritorial activities of large TNCs include
numerous investment projects that are carried out without conducting HRDD
that involve all potential stakeholders (individuals and communities), resulting in
severe violations of stakeholders’ basic socio-economic rights.271
Fourth, big pharmaceutical companies disproportionally focus on the spread
of diseases in developed countries, ignoring the right to health of the global poor
and allowing for millions of preventable deaths annually.272
Fifth, development assistance policies and projects implemented by Western
donor-states, IGOs, international foundations, and NGOs are often used as a

IN NGO DISCOURSE: THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF NGOS IN AFRICA
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS ch. 1-2 (2002);

14–16, 41 (2007); JOSEPH E.
William Easterly, What Did
Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank
Adjustment Loans, 76 J. DEVELOPMENT ECON. (2005); Elham Seyedsayamdost, A World Without
Poverty: Negotiating the Global Development Agenda 75–94 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University).
269

270

For example, the international intellectual property regime under the WTO TRIPS agreement
violates the right to adequate food and the right to health in poor societies. The WTO treaty system
practice pushes poor countries to open their markets while impeding access for their production to
markets of developed states. This practice prevents the residents of developing countries from
enjoying the right to a decent standard of living. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or
Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002); Jagdish
N. Bhagwati, Reshaping the WTO, 168 FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 25 (2005); GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 139. See also Statement of the Third World Network at the WTO Symposia
on Trade and Environment and Trade and Development (Ma. 1999), http://perma.cc/A3AN-2KR2.
Opening markets would allow poor countries to receive additional export earnings (according to
the UNCTAD, $700 billion annually) and gain wealth (according to Pogge, over $100 billion
annually), which is comparable to contemporary ODA rates ($146.6 billion). See UNCTAD, TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT IX, 143 (1999); POLITICS, supra note 43, at 20; OECD Development
Aid, supra note 114. The OECD estimates that elimination of all merchandise tariffs and reduction
in trade costs by 1% would increase welfare in developing states by $90.05 billion a year. PATRICK
LOVE & RALPH LATTIMORE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FREE, FAIR AND OPEN? 60 (2009).
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See, for example, FIAN International, Case Work, http://perma.cc/45R4-7GT4; COOMANS &
KÜNNEMANN, supra note 154, at 5.
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PAUL HUNT ET AL. NEGLECTED DISEASES: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS (2007); Paul Hunt, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, The Right to Health, IV, U.N. Doc. A/63/263 (2008);
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 145; WORLD POVERTY, supra note 43, at 222–23.
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means for dominating developing societies.273 Such policies and projects often fail
to take into account the actual needs of the poor and are extremely inefficient,
insufficient, and violate the human rights of recipients of assistance.274
In all of these examples, we see global institutional injustice, which manifests
itself not in harmful programs of the international distribution of social goods or
resources, but in the lack of institutional guarantees of the relation between
individuals from developing and developed countries (acting directly or indirectly
through their states or other representatives) as equals in the processes of creating
global norms, policies, institutions, and practices. This global relational injustice is
the cause of distributive injustice, global poverty, and extreme inequality. Such
detrimental effects cannot be eliminated without the removal of their cause.
Furthermore, relational injustice distorts the allocation of jurisdiction over
issues concerning global distributive justice. Most salient, perhaps, is the resistance
of powerful Western states to solving problems related to global distributive
injustice within the U.N., keeping them under the jurisdiction of the Bretton
Woods Institutions, over which they exercise control.275 Ironically, it is the actors
who press for a program of democratization and liberalization in developing
countries that prevent these reforms in the global domain. The prevailing view is
that liberal wealthy states are interested in relational justice at the cost of a
distributive one.276 However, this seems to be true only at the local level. In the
global domain, powerful states express no interest in limiting their dominance for
the sake of relational justice. Instead, they prefer reducing the problem of global
justice to issues of development assistance, which is interpreted not as a human
rights-based obligation but as a voluntary commitment of donors.277
Obligations of relational justice should have priority over those of
distributive justice. This would allow targeting the main efforts against global
poverty and extreme inequality not only at their consequences, but also at their
273

See Gay J. McDougall, A Decade of NGO Struggle, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12, 15 (2004); Makau Mutua,
Human Rights International NGOs: A Critical Evaluation, in NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE AND
PERFORMANCE 151 (C.E. Welch, Jr. ed., 2001).
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Public and private assistance programs are often carried out without involving poor individuals or
their representatives and without undertaking HRIAs with the participation of the latter. Those in
poverty are presumed to be helpless, irresponsible, and incapable of being full-fledged subjects,
both right-holders and duty-bearers, in extraterritorial relations and agents of change. See
Pribytkova, supra note 78, at 305–15. See also generally DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT
WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009); WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE
WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL
AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006).
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See Margot Salomon, From NIEO to Now and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice, 62 INT’L & COMP.
L. Q. 31, 50–51 (2013).
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See TAN, supra note 28, at 8.
See also VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 6, at 69.
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cause. Under conditions of fair relations in the process of global decision-making,
fair principles of distributive justice could be embedded in international norms
and institutions. Moreover, as contemporary studies demonstrate, a just global
institutional system that does not violate human rights of people in developing
countries may be sufficient for their self-rescue from poverty.278
Basic equality establishes a minimum standard of justice—the recognition of
equal moral value of individuals—for both local and global domains. Though
basic equality does not, using Dworkin’s language, demand that individuals be
treated equally, it nonetheless requires them to be treated and respected as equals,
regardless of their place of birth, residence, or citizenship, by all agents of
justice.279 A just global institutional order should enable individuals to enjoy equal
status and to act as full-fledged agents in the global domain—to take part in
creating and maintaining the key institutions that influence their exercising of
human rights.280
How should individuals’ full-fledged agency be guaranteed in the global
order? Section III.B(2) pointed to two main ways for individuals to be represented
in the global domain: through their state and through participation in global civil
society. An internationally-recognized way to exercise the right to take part in the
design and administration of global institutions is political participation in the
affairs of one’s state. However, this tool often fails for two reasons: the
undemocratic structure of many states and the unfair global institutional scheme.
In the state-centered order, the most vulnerable individuals can hardly speak on
their own behalf and be heard, and are unable to directly seek assistance from the
international community or hold their state and global actors accountable for
violations of their human rights. Relatedly, the unfair organization of the global
order prevents individuals’ full-fledged agency: first, by not taking into account
the interests of individuals by major global actors in creating and implementing
policies, which affect their enjoyment of human rights; and second, through the
dominance of developed states over developing ones in global rule-making and
institutional design. Under these conditions, the recognition of individuals’ agency
in the global domain is the only way for them to assert and to realize human rights
associated with their membership in humanity.
Thus, the imperative of basic equality calls for two measures in the domain
of relational justice. On the one hand, it demands the recognition of individuals
278
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individuals, or by Rainer Forst as the right of moral persons to not just be passive recipients, but
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as full-fledged subjects of extraterritorial relations with the ability to assert their
rights directly, as well as through their social and state networks. This includes
ensuring their access to information about and participation in all decisionmaking, norm-setting, and institution-designing processes that concern their
human rights, including ex ante and ex post HRIAs and HRDD, as well as providing
their direct and affordable access to effective remedies. On the other hand, it
requires guarantees of representation of individuals’ interests by the state that
governs them. These imply measures to correct the asymmetries in international
decision-making processes by ensuring fair representation of developing states as
equal members of the international community and taking into account the
fundamental interests and human rights of people, especially the most vulnerable
individuals and social groups, that they are representing.281
In this respect, the right to a just global order gives rise not only to remedial
institutional obligations (aimed at correcting the injustice of the contemporary
institutional scheme), but also to global institutional obligations (focused on filling
the gaps in the existing international human rights instruments and creating new
normative instruments, institutions, and practices). As demonstrated, not only
negative obligations to respect,282 but also positive obligations to protect and
fulfill, correspond to the right to a just global order. The obligations to prevent
unjust practices by third parties and create a just global institutional scheme, apply
not only to actors responsible for violations of their negative duties, but to all
global players. Though actors engaged in creating and maintaining unjust practices
bear primary obligations to compensate victims for the harms they cause,
relational justice cannot be achieved without the engagement of the most
vulnerable subjects. Relational justice can be realized only through these subjects’
full-fledged participation in significant decision-making, norm-setting, and
institution-designing processes. Only collective action involving all stakeholders
can, therefore, lead to the significant structural changes that are necessary on local,
regional, and global levels.

D. Global Obligations of Distributive Justice
Along with guarantees of relational justice, global human rights obligations
call for certain distributive arrangements that are indispensable for the universal
enjoyment of basic socio-economic rights. This Section discusses global
obligations of distributive justice.
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Although basic equality does not require an equal distribution of resources,
wealth, or income either among states or between individuals, it is incompatible
with conditions of extreme poverty and extreme inequality. That is why basic
equality represents a demand for securing universal access to a decent social
minimum, which is a key principle of social and global justice.
These intuitions underlie the international community’s recognition of the
right to an adequate standard of living.283 The UDHR and the ICESCR
acknowledge this right, along with states’ corresponding obligations to “take
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.”284
In its Comments, the CESCR specifies global obligations to cooperate and assist
corresponding to the components of the right to an adequate standard of living
(which include the rights to adequate food, water, sanitation, housing, and
health).285 Thus, international law initially proceeded from the premises that the
right to a decent standard of living should be realized not only locally but also
globally, and that not only states, but also other global actors and the international
community as a whole, bear duties corresponding to that right.
Although the right to a decent standard of living is at the center of the
minimum socio-economic conditions necessary for the realization of a decent
social minimum, it does not exhaust them. The implementation of other basic
socio-economic rights (including the rights to social security, job security and
equal employment, decent work conditions, rest and leisure, just and favorable
remuneration, minimum wage, education, and participation in cultural life)
constitutes an important guarantee of a decent social minimum.
This raises a question regarding the scope of the guarantees embraced by a
global social minimum. The most authoritative theory of justice, developed by
Rawls, yields the “maximin” or “difference” principle. This principle calls for an
institutional order that maximizes the benefits of the least advantaged, but it does
not guarantee that the minimum level of well-being indispensable for enjoying a

283

Historically, the principle of human dignity has been the starting point for the justification of the
human right to a decent standard of living by various, and even competing, approaches. See Elena
Pribytkova, The Human Right to a Dignified Existence: The Ethical Foundations of the Contemporary Legal
Order, in 137 ARSP BEIHEFT, HUMAN DIGNITY AS A FOUNDATION OF LAW 117 (2013).

284

UDHR, supra note 2, at art. 25, ¶ 1; ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 11 ¶ 1. The ICESCR places
emphasis on the necessity to cooperate internationally for the realization of “the fundamental right
of everyone to be free from hunger” as the core element of the right to an adequate food. In
particular, it requires “ensur[ing] an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to
need.” ICESCR, supra note 27, at art. 11 ¶ 2.
See CESCR Gen. Comment No. 4, supra note 230, at ¶¶ 10, 13, 19; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 12,
supra note 130, at ¶¶ 36, 38, 40; CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 38, 40, 45, 63;
CESCR Gen. Comment No. 15, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 30–38.

285

446

Vol. 20 No. 2

What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have?

Pribytkova

decent life can be achieved in impoverished countries.286 This Article maintains
that the scope of global obligations to secure a decent social minimum should be
consistent with the principle of sufficiency. It cannot, therefore, be confined to
guarantees necessary for mere survival and freedom from extreme poverty, but
should be sufficient to ensure a dignified social existence of individuals. A
dignified existence implies individuals’ involvement and full-fledged participation
in all core social, political, and cultural institutions and practices, including
important decision-making processes, as well as access to shared material and
intellectual values and an opportunity for their moral and intellectual
flourishing.287 In other words, global obligations of distributive justice should
enable individuals to enjoy a decent life and basic guarantees of relational justice.
The principle of sufficiency calls for global actors’ obligations to cooperate in
accumulating enough resources for the universal fulfillment of basic socioeconomic rights indispensable for leading a decent life.
The principle of sufficiency should be balanced by the principle of a decent
minimum sacrifice. Under the latter, the burdens of global obligations should be
compatible with the fundamental interests, human rights, and obligations of global
actors. Balancing the two principles is possible through a fair allocation of global
obligations among all members of the international community.288
As global obligations of relational justice, distributive global obligations
include not only interactional but also institutional duties, which are simultaneous
with domestic obligations and are addressed to all members of the international
community.289 Institutional obligations of distributive justice include: (1)
286
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elaborating a global normative framework for ensuring socio-economic
guarantees of a decent life; (2) creating and maintaining a system of institutions
for securing access to a decent standard of living universally, including institutions
for mobilizing resources and providing assistance to those in extreme poverty; and
(3) developing judicial, quasi-judicial, and non-judicial individual complaint
mechanisms at regional and international levels for holding multiple actors
accountable for their breaches of global obligations.
All members of the international community (states, NSAs, IGOs, and
individuals) share global human rights obligations to create an institutional system
necessary for the realization of a decent social minimum. Researchers and
practitioners have demonstrated successfully that the problems of world poverty
and the systematic violation of socio-economic rights are caused not by the lack
of resources, but rather the lack of a fair system of institutions that regulate their
accumulation and use.290 The world community has sufficient means to eradicate
poverty, feed all suffering from malnutrition, and provide essential medicine to all
dying from poverty-related diseases. Global poverty is avoidable at relatively low
costs (and in compliance with the principle of a decent minimum sacrifice)
provided that global obligations are fairly distributed among all global actors.291

E. Summary
Global human rights obligations that comprehend both duties of result (to
realize basic socio-economic rights worldwide and to create a global institutional
structure indispensable for their realization) and duties of conduct (to cooperate
and assist in their implementation) are primary and simultaneous obligations of
multiple actors. They are simultaneous in that they should be implemented in
parallel to territorial human rights obligations (Section IV.A). Global obligations
are aimed at securing certain minimum guarantees in the domains of relational and
distributive justice that are essential for the enjoyment of basic equality (Section
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IV.B). Relational justice guarantees should ensure individuals’ full-fledged
participation in all key global institutions and practices, including important
decision-making processes that affect their exercise of socio-economic rights
(Section IV.C). A global distributive scheme should embody a decent social
minimum (Section IV.D).

V. C ONCLUSION
This Article addressed underexamined issues surrounding global obligations.
It sought to refute prevailing prejudices about such obligations in contemporary
legal discourse and practice and outline the main contours of the legal conception
of global obligations.
The major conclusions of this Article are as follows. The idea of humancentricity, which sees a person as the ultimate unit of both moral and legal
concern, is embedded in the International Bill of Human Rights and serves as a
justifying basis for global obligations. Global obligations are morally justified
human rights obligations. They should receive legal recognition, regulation, and
implementation within the global polycentric community of multiple autonomous
actors. This is a significant precondition for the shift from a state-centered to a
human-centered global order, in which the state and global civil society should
serve as two important “channels” for representing the interests and protecting
human rights of individuals in the global domain. Two important steps for this
shift are: (1) the recognition of individuals as independent subjects of
extraterritorial legal relations capable of demanding the realization of their human
rights directly from global actors and holding the latter accountable; and (2) the
allocation of extraterritorial obligations, including global obligations, to all
members of the international community—states, IGOs, NSAs, and
individuals— which should be acknowledged as primary agents of global justice
and as duty-bearers of extraterritorial obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill
socio-economic rights. Additionally, global obligations are simultaneous, which
means that they should be implemented in parallel to territorial human rights
obligations. In their interactional and institutional aspects, global obligations
comprehend both duties of result (to realize socio-economic rights necessary for
the enjoyment of a decent standard of living worldwide and to create a just global
institutional structure indispensable for their realization), and duties of conduct
(to cooperate and to assist in the implementation of socio-economic rights).
Finally, global human rights obligations are aimed at ensuring certain minimum
guarantees in domains of relational and distributive justice that are essential for
the enjoyment of basic equality. Relational justice guarantees should ensure
individuals’ full-fledged participation in all key global institutions and practices,
including important decision-making processes, while a global distributive scheme
should embody a decent social minimum universally.
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